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ABSTRACT
Intelligence analysts depend on the ability to understand the social networks of sus-
pects and adversaries. We develop a novel method for automatically discovering this
information from digital storage media by analyzing byte-offset proximity between
digital artifacts on the raw media. We show that this method can be used to group
email addresses that indicate real communication between users and those that do
not. Furthermore, in the case where addresses do represent communication between
users, our analysis indicates that classic measures of centrality are effective for iden-
tifying important nodes and close associates, and that further study of modularity
classes may be a promising method of partitioning complex components. Finally,
in support of the above work, we also created a tagged dataset of graphs for which
ground truth was determined by interviews with the owners, and which can be used
for future study in this area. Two objectives motivated this thesis, both of which
serve the greater goal of making analysts more efficient. The first was to reduce the
time digital analysts consume sorting through the results, in order to complete cases
in a timely manner. The second was to eliminate data that was not relevant to dis-
covering social networks, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of eventually paving
the way for an automated process that identifies social structures.
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Even before the advent of commercial social networking sites, law enforcement and
intelligence communities have been interested in social network discovery as a tool
for understanding the hierarchy of entities they encounter in the course of their in-
vestigations. The ability of intelligence analysts to determine relationships between
individuals is a powerful resource in discovering the structure of larger social orga-
nizations, such as corporations, cartels, cults, cliques and other groups connected by
similar objectives or ideologies. Investigators use this information to identify peo-
ple who hold leadership positions or possess key information as well as to analyze
behavior patterns of individuals and groups.
Often investigators learn social network structures by questioning subjects during an
interview or an interrogation. However, there are many problems with interrogating
human beings, including reluctance of the interviewee to disclose valuable information,
failure to remember information completely or correctly, or intentional misrepresen-
tation of facts. Even when the interviewee is cooperative, the interview process is
resource intensive in that it requires considerable analyst time and skill. Further, the
interview must take into account the needs and rights of the interviewee—for exam-
ple, an interrogation of human subjects involves far more restrictive time constraints
than processes that deal with digital devices. Unlike the former, the latter can be
copied reliably and in many cases stored indefinitely.
An alternative to interviewing is to find social networks by analyzing digital media
owned or used by the subject of interest. Provided that this method can achieve
results of similar quality, extracting social network information automatically from
digital media offers analysts a way to obtain this information without the need for
direct interrogations and their inherent limitations. As electronic devices become
increasingly involved in all aspects of interpersonal communication, the strategy of
extracting information about social network structures from digital devices becomes
more and more promising. This holds true especially because the use of digital devices
creates persistent digital artifacts: every time a person makes a phone call, sends a
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text, sends an email, or logs into a chat room she leaves a trace of her activity. Often,
this trace is sufficient to allow an analyst to deduce the group of people she is in
communication with and therefore is in some type of relationship with.
There are two methods currently available for accessing these traces. The first is
through an interface into an information system that contains data related to social
networking. Examples of such systems include dedicated social networking services
such as Facebook and Twitter that offer users the ability to create profiles and curate
a list of contacts. More generally, communication-related services like email servers,
forums, chat rooms, etc., are also sources of social networking information. One
strategy for obtaining a picture of a user’s social network would be to access such
services and analyze the contact lists they contain. The advantages of this method are
easy access to the relevant data (provided we have the authorization) and the ability
to quickly locate this data using the organization already defined by the system.
However, this method requires the analyst to overcome a number of challenges. Access
may be restricted by permissions set by the interface. For example, if the target
system is Facebook restrictions may be imposed by user settings or company policy
and, much like in the interview process, these entities may have little motivation to
cooperate with investigators. Users often have a high level of control over the data
they are storing on online services, and can delete critical information. Moreover,
information held by any single service may not be comprehensive for a given user,
and the analyst may not have a complete list of all the services to which a user
subscribes. The design of the interface may work against the goals of the examiner
by failing to provide a mechanism for accessing the data of interest. For example,
in the case where the target interface is a file system, artifacts stored in unallocated
space are unavailable through the API. Finally, it is the difficulty of automating
analysis, due to the dynamic nature of applications. Software tends to change over
time and it is inefficient for engineers to constantly write new programs to read
changing applications.
The second method is to bypass the system’s interface and directly access the under-
lying data. This can be accomplished with digital forensic tools that read raw bytes
from storage media. In our research, we explore this second option, since this method
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allows us to bypass the file system and restrictions placed by applications, conduct
parallel queries, perform batch processing and access areas designated as “free space”
or unallocated. This method does have challenges, which include acquisition of the
media, the need to mine large volumes of data in limited time, the dynamic nature
of the data, and the difficulty of visualizing the results. A detailed discussion of each
of these issues follows.
The advent of cloud-based storage complicates data acquisition. Wireless capabilities
have increased in availability and speed, causing data generated on digital devices
to be more cloud based. The Chromebook, for example, pushes the user to store
most of his data on Google’s servers rather than on his local machine. Cloud based
storage has decreased the number of messages and records stored on local machines.
These artifacts are instead stored in the cloud on private servers. These obstacles
have increased the difficulty of discovering information about social circles on local
devices, which in turn increases the difficulty of pin pointing possible witnesses and
co-conspirators. Obtaining access to cloud-based data is hard. It is often difficult
to get approval to access the servers this data is stored on, let alone approval to
confiscate machines run by service providers. To request access to Cloud Servers,
which may or may not be located in one’s home country, requires analyst time and
resources and is not guaranteed to be successful. The goal of our approach is to
find relevant information on local storage so that the need for further investigation
of cloud-based storage is minimized.
Another obstacle in regards to data acquisition is data collection on local machines.
Data acquisition is difficult because storage media is heterogeneous. Currently there
are many different operating systems running on many different platforms. Any
attempt to automate the collection process has to be able to consolidate information
in a useful way from different data sets and different formats. Failing to solve this
problem burdens the analyst with the task of sorting through many different types of
systems, which only makes their job that much harder. A goal of the current work is
to make the data collection and formatting automated so that analysts can dedicate
more time to actual investigations.
The next problem is the volume of data. Traditionally, investigators use a myriad
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of techniques to collect digital evidence such as phone records, email messages, and
text messages in order to discover social networks. Collection of this type of data has
become increasingly tedious due to the decreasing cost of storage in digital devices
and their increasing capability to store larger data sets. This creates a vast amount of
data, which is difficult for investigators to sort through. Looking for relevant pieces
of information through huge data sets is like digging for diamonds; an extraordinary
amount of time and effort is consumed before anything of value turns up. As the
amount of digital storage increases and its price decreases, the amount of data that
an analyst has to study or look through becomes too much to process in a timely
manner.
The last problem is the ability to display results in a format that humans can quickly
process. One tool that we build on top of is Bulk Extractor [1] which is a digital
forensic tool that extracts various data from storage devices. It is a widely used tool
for extracting email addresses—both in law enforcement and other domains. One of
the Bulk Extractors output is a text file with a list of email address, their offset on
the storage device, and some content located around the email address. An example
of its output is shown in Figure 1.1:
Figure 1.1: Bulk Extractor email.txt output from a M57-Patent Drive, Re-
alistic Data Corpus
After using the software on our test set, this file would tend to have hundreds of
thousands of lines of output. It is not easy to determine what is important from
hundreds of thousands of lines of text. Our goal was to take that information and
process it to show the most relevant data. It is important that all the essential
data be captured while not overwhelming analyst with busy screens. The simplicity
desired needs to be balanced with ensuring that critical information is not left out.
In addition, background information that makes a scenario clearer must be readily
4
available when requested, without cluttering up the screen when it is not. Currently,
there is nothing on the market that offers such a service, which created a void that
could be fulfilled by our research. There is a need for automated systems that enhance
the ability of investigators to perform analysis quickly and effectively. An analyst uses
adaptability from experience and expertise to come up with the correct solutions to
solve a case. It is a person’s ability to process human behavior that would make them
better than a computer at recognizing true patterns of social networks. Therefore, a
solution is needed that couples a computer’s ability to automate tedious tasks and
people’s ability to use their best judgment.
1.1 Motivation
Two objectives motivated this thesis. The first was to reduce the time digital analysts
consume sorting through the results, in order to complete cases in a timely manner.
The second was to eliminate data that was not relevant to discovering social networks,
in order to achieve the ultimate goal of eventually paving the way for an automated
process that identifies social structures. Both these objectives are intended to make
analysts more efficient during their investigation.
In light of these objectives, this thesis seeks to address the following research ques-
tions:
• Can the proximity and quantity of co-located email address pairs on secondary
storage media be used to discover information about social networks?
• Can these properties be used to distinguish between true positives (email ad-
dresses used for communication between human users) and false positives such
as text which happens to have the commercial at symbol.
Analysts can currently extract email addresses from digital media using Bulk Extrac-
tor. However, Bulk Extractor’s email scanner has a high false positive rate. This
means that analysts have to manually sort through many results that do not indi-
cate evidence of real communication between human users. The current research
attempted to make strides towards methods to reduce false positives, and identify
potential associates. Our goal was to make progress towards a tool that would auto-
mate social network discovery by focusing on email addresses found in digital media.
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A secondary goal was to create an automated process to distinguish email addresses
that do and do not provide useful information to the analyst.
1.2 Contributions
We develop a new method of analyzing relationships between email addresses on drives
which relies solely on byte-offset proximity between the addresses and is therefore
independent of OS, file system, or application-layer structures. By creating graphs
of email addresses where linked nodes represent email addresses co-located in the
same area of a storage device, we are able to quickly create graphs where components
consist of related email addresses. We show that this method can be used to group
email addresses that indicate real communication between users and those that do
not. Furthermore, in the case where addresses do represent communication between
users, we demonstrate that the resulting components contain information about the
users’ social networks.
By visualizing the graphs produced in this analysis, we develop a novel method of
analyzing forensic artifacts, which has the potential to reduce analyst workload. In
addition, we perform a preliminary analysis of the properties of our two types of
components (those that are not related to social network information and those that
are). With respect to graphs that do not display social networks we conducted cross-
drive analysis and recorded which graphs were similar to graphs on different storage
devices in our dataset. For graphs that do display social networks, we identify four
major classes of graphs that merit further study. Furthermore, we record node count,
edge count, modularity, average weight, eccentricity, and closeness scores, as well as
which type of centrality best displayed the drive owner’s closer associates. The two
measures tested were Eigenvector and Betweeness. Our early findings suggest that
future research into using these metrics to automatically classify email addresses is
promising.
In support of the above work, we also created a test set of drives for which ground
truth was determined by interviews with the owners. We tagged these graphs based
on whether or not the graphs demonstrated social networks or if the results were
unclear. Graphs that were tagged as not containing social network information can
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be used by those interested in future work to identify and remove graphs that do not
display social networks. Additionally, graphs tagged as interesting can be used by
those who would like to prototype algorithms for identifying social network graphs or
identifying graphs that do not display properties of social network graphs.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background information
on forensic and visualization techniques, as well as previous work conducted in this
area. Chapter 3 describes the tools designed for our social network graphs. Chap-
ter 4 presents our methodology and experiment design for creating social network
graphs that display syndicate organizations. Chapter 5 describes our experiments
and analysis. In Chapter 6 we present our conclusion and propose areas for future
work.
7




This chapter presents higher level concepts essential to our research. We begin with
an introduction to Network Science, which includes a series of useful definitions. Af-
terwards we discuss properties of secondary storage and bulk data analysis. These
concepts are important because in our research we created network graphs by ex-
tracting data using bulk data analysis tools. We also analyzed them using Network
Science concepts. The data we looked for were email addresses located on storage
devices. Therefore it is important to have a basic understanding of secondary storage
devices, email protocols and formats.
2.1 Network Science Concepts
Network Science is an area of study that focuses on the interconnection of things.
The things can be in any field from the relationships of routers in computer networks
to actors playing in the same Hollywood movies. The properties of the relationships
provide interesting and useful insights, such as which animal is at the top of the food
chain, how many airplane routes can get you from New York to San Francisco, or
what group of people are likely to study for a midterm during the Super Bowl.
In order to study these connections we create networks. A network is a derivative
of a graph, which will be explained in further detail in 2.1.1. A graph is used in
Graph Theory to study the mathematical properties of nodes and edges and the
relationships between them. A network is used to study the relationships between
discrete objects. Often network and graph is used interchangeably. We felt it was
important to highlight the subtle difference and to stress that Network Science was
developed from Graph Theory.
Sometimes, learning about a particular network is not enough. You might want to
compare different networks to each other. Reasons for this would include determining
which is more efficient. For example, in a network of highways it might be better for
traffic if they all connect at a common location or it might be better if they do not
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connect at all. You would have to compare the two. Before we continue further,
below is a section on common terminology to ensure our usage of these words is clear.
2.1.1 Terminology
First we give the definitions of networks and graphs. Then we provide the definitions
of the components that make up a network including edges, nodes, and components.
We will then review ways to classify the parts of the network, and finally ways to
classify the entire network itself.
Basic Concepts
Graphs, Sub-graphs, and Social Networks : As previously stated a graph is an inter-
connected group of things and a network is a graph that has concrete properties. The
term graph is often used in place of the word network. The definition is the following:
“A Graph G is an ordered pair of finite disjoint sets (N,E) such that E is a subset of
the set N ×N of unordered pairs of N . The set N is the set of [nodes] and E is the
set of edges. If G is a graph, then N = N(G) is the node set of G, and E = E(G) is
the edge set. An edge {x, y} is said to join the nodes x and y and is denoted by xy.
Thus xy and yx means exactly the same edge; the nodes x and y are the endnodes of
this edge” [2].
As the complexity of the network increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to under-
stand. We want to break the graphs down into manageable clusters of related items
to study. These are called sub-graphs since they are smaller components of the larger
network. A Sub-graph “is a subset of nodes and edges within a larger graph.” [3].
The networks we discuss involve people. When the relationships in the network are
between people these networks are called “Social Networks”. “A social network is a
social structure made up of individuals (or organizations) called ’nodes’, which are
tied (connected) by one or more specific types of interdependency, such as friend-
ship, kinship, common interest, financial exchange, dislike, sexual relationships, or
relationships of beliefs, knowledge or prestige.” [4]
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Network Components
Nodes, Edges, and Components : A network contains the items that we are studying.
In this paper we will refer to those items as nodes. In Network Science or Graph
Theory materials, you will often hear them called actors or vertices as well. “A [node]
is a discrete individual, organization, event or collective social entity that links to
others in a network.” [5]
The connections between nodes are called Edges. These edges represent relationships
between nodes, an individual, a pair or a group. In a network of police officers, you
can have edges which represent who an officer went to respond to an incident with.
If in the graph you allowed edges to self-loop then you could tell who responded to
the most calls by the amount of edges a node has to itself. You may also be able
to determine who a particular officer’s partner is, since partners tend to respond to
incidents together. Edges are also referred to as ties or links.
A graph can have one or more Components. A component of a graph is a set of
nodes that are connected by some path. For example, let us consider a classroom of
elementary students, where the students are represented by nodes and the relationship
is between nodes that have the same teacher. If the graph included one class then all
students would be connected and the graph would have one component. If the graph
included all classes in the elementary school then there would be as many component
as there was classes, assuming a teacher did not teach more than one class.
Characterizing Nodes
Clustering Coefficient, Centrality, Closeness and Degree: When classifying a network,
its nodes, edges and components can be characterized. In our research we focused on
the statistics surrounding the various nodes. In particular we were concerned with the
clustering coefficients, centrality, closeness and degree. The “Clustering Coefficient is
a measure of the likelihood that two associates of a node are associates themselves.
A higher clustering coefficient indicates a greater ‘cliquishness’.” [4]
11







where Ci is the coefficient for every node, n is the total number of nodes in the graph
and C¯ is the average coefficient.
The “Centralization of a network is the extent to which a network is centralized




[c∗ − ci]′ (2.2)
where ci is the centrality of node i and c∗ is the centrality of the most central node.”
The “Centrality of [a node] is the extent to which [a node] occupies a central po-
sition in the network in one of the following ways: having many [edges] to other
actors(degree centrality), being able to reach many other [nodes](close centrality),
connecting other [nodes] who have no direct connections (betweenness centrality),
or having connections to centrally located [nodes](eigenvector centrality).” [5]. The
methods of centrality that we will focus on is degree, betweenness, and closeness.
The “Betweenness Centrality of [a node] is the extent to which [a node] serves as
a potential ’go-between’ for other pairs of [nodes] in the network by occupying an
intermediary position on the shortest path connecting other [nodes].” [5] The formula







where B(Ni) is the betweenness of node i, Sjk is the number of shortest paths between
nodes j and k, and Sjk(Ni) is the shortest path between j and k that contain node i.
The “Closeness Centrality of [a node] is the extent to which the most direct path
connecting [a node] to each of the other [nodes] in a network are short rather than
long. This measure is only meaningful for a fully-connected network in which there
are no isolated [nodes]. A high closeness score means [a node] can access many other
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[nodes] and is therefore relatively independent of the control of others.” [5]






(1 6= j) (2.4)
where CC , the Closeness Centrality of node i is the inverse of the sum of the shortest
path distances connecting every pair of nodes. The degree of each node depends on
how many different nodes are connected to it.
The “Degree Centrality is the number of connections that [a node] has in a net-
work.” [5]




Xij(i 6= j) (2.5)
where CD(Ni) denotes degree centrality for node i and
∑g
j=1 counts the number of
direct [edges] that node i has to the other j nodes in the graph.
Characterizing the Network
A goal during our study, was to calculate normalized statics so that we can compare
graphs of different shapes and sizes. Typically, we were interested in the connect-
edness, size, and density in a graph. Many times these calculations have predictive
powers. For example, if you are looking at a communications network and track
how information is passed through the nodes you can predict the minimum num-
ber of nodes needed to spread information as quickly as possible to everyone in the
graph. In fact many businesses do this type of analysis in order to conduct targeted
advertising.
“A Connected Network is one in which every [node] can reach every other [node] either
directly or through an intermediary: there are no isolates.” [9]
The size of the network depends on how many items (nodes) are in it. For example,
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a graph of a standard elementary school class would be around 20-30 nodes. The
density is dependent on how many edges a graph has running through it, the more
edges, the more dense it is. At times a network displays special properties such as
having a community or a clique. A community in a graph, is when a group of nodes
have more connections(increased density) within a group then to other nodes in the
graph. “Communities are a sub-graph of a network whose nodes are more tightly
connected with each other than with nodes outside the sub-graph.” [10]. A clique is
where all nodes in a group have connections to each other. More formally, “A clique
is a group of three or more nodes that are all are connected to each other and have
no common edge to any outside nodes.” [5]. In a clique everyone knows everyone, so
there is an edge between any two nodes.
“A k-Core ” is a component of a graph that is created by removing all nodes which
have a degree less than k. The definition is the following: “Let G be a graph. If H is
a subgraph of G, δ(H) will denote the minimum degree of H; each point of H is thus
adjacent to at least δ(H) other points of H. If H is a maximal connected (induced)
subgraph of G with δ(H) >k, we say that H is a k-core of G [11].”
The k-Core with the maximum value of k that yields a non-empty graph is referred
to simply as the core.
2.2 Properties of Storage Devices
We obtained storage devices to study the information they had written on them.
It is valuable to understand how they work. Hard drives are one type of digital
storage device. Hard drives have a series of platters that can store digital information.
The platters are separated into sections called tracks and sectors. These sections
are similar to file cabinets with a multitude of draws and folders holding important
documents.
The goal for storage devices is to allow users to access information quickly. Offices
tend to achieve this goal by organizing their paperwork in file cabinets and operating
systems similarly have a filing system to organize data on the hard drive. Documents
that are related are usually stored in the same area in an office filing system and as
such documents that are related are for the most part stored in the same area on the
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hard-drive.
While flash memory does not have moving parts like hard drives, they still hold
information by partitioning the memory into files and folders. Related information
tends to be stored together. This is important because in theory we can grab a chunk
of data or set of folders to continue with the office analogy, and it should contain
information that is related to each other. Operating Systems do not always organize
data in close proximity but for a majority of similar files they do and it is this spatial
locality that we attempt to take advantage of with our research.
We gain access to storage devices in order to exam them, by collecting disk images.
A disk image is an exact copy of an entire storage device. Not only does it copy
the contents but the structure of the storage device also. Normally, a person may
just copy files off of another person’s storage device, for example all the pictures
from last summer’s vacation. However, sometimes much more is needed. Maybe the
computer has a lifetime of special software and a fancy operating system that should
be retained? In this case a disc image is needed to copy the entire structure and
contents of the computer the way they are.
2.3 Email Protocols and Formats
It is important to understand email protocols and formats. In our research we studied
email addresses that were extracted from storage devices. Understanding the prop-
erties of these protocols or formats is essential to understanding why we expected to
see a relationship between email addresses.
Personal Storage Table (.pst) and Off-line Storage Table (.ost) are file formats created
by Microsoft for use with Microsoft Exchange, Windows Messaging and Microsoft
Outlook. These formats allow Outlook users to store their emails on their device
directly or on a secondary storage system. These file formats are a fixed size and can
increase when additional data is stored. When data is erased they are not reduced in
size. Instead the space is marked as free and will remain until overwritten by some
new data. These formats appeal to users because when they store their emails locally,
they do not use up their allocated server space and they have access to their data
when they are off line.
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MBOX is a name for various file formats to include mboxo and mboxrd. These file
formats hold all email messages in a single file. All the messages are appended to each
other. The format knows where an email starts with the word “From” or whatever
word is typically listed first in the email client being used. EML(.eml) is a file format
typically used by Outlook Express. It is used to save or send an email. It stores the
email message and any attachments or links.
Personal Address Book(PAB) and Oﬄine Address Book (OAB) allow users to have
access to their contacts when they are not connected to the Internet. When the user
is online, their address book is updated and when they go off-line their contacts are
stored on their local machine. A VCARD is a virtual business card. This means it
has all the information you would typically find on a business card, but instead of
being physical it is digital. VCARDS are usually sent as an attachment to an email
message.
Post Office Protocol(POP), POP2, and POP3 are email protocols that store emails on
a remote server until a user downloads that email to their local machines. Once that
happens the email is deleted from the remote server and only stored locally. Internet
Message Access Protocol (IMAP) is a protocol that stores emails on a remote server
until the user deletes the email from the server. Message Application Programming
Interface (MAPI) is Microsoft’s proprietary email protocol and is similar to IMAP in
that it allows emails to be stored on their remote servers until deleted by a user.
Regardless of which protocol is used, there are email clients such as Thunderbird that
allow users to store a copy of their email messages on their local machine. Email
clients are different from web based email because with web based email a user would
have to connect to the Internet to create new messages and access stored messages.
Email clients are stored on a user’s local machine. While a user needs to be online
to send and receive mail, with an email client they can read archived messages and
create new messages.
Many users have free web based email servers such as Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo.
These web based email servers make it difficult to recover email from local hard drives
since they are stored remotely. However, when users pull and read messages from off
their mail severs these items are cached and can be recovered. In addition, many
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local machines save frequent user name and passwords to make it easier for users
to log into their various online accounts. These bits of information can be useful
for investigators to discover email addresses used for log-ins and email addresses of
frequently contacted individuals.
2.4 Forensic Analysis Tools
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we had to overcome the fact that devices are managed
by different file systems. A file system is the data structure that an operating system
uses to access its files. Imagine trying to use the Army’s filing system, the Modern
Army Record Keeping System to access files in libraries, which use the Dewey Decibel
Classification System. This problem made it challenging to use one application to
navigate different file systems.
2.4.1 Using the System Interface
Despite the inherent challenges of creating general solutions for heterogeneous inter-
faces, such as file systems, there were times when it was useful to inspect metadata
related to the artifacts we were examining, such as the file path, if any, associated
with the sectors from which the addresses had been extracted. The file path and file
name offered clues as to the origin of the data. When we wanted to further investigate
data from the image, we attempted to use The Sleuth Kit to navigate the file system.
The Sleuth Kit is a suite of command line tools designed for forensic analysis of disk
images.
The Sleuth Kit is notable because it does attempt to understand all major file systems.
It is relatively successful since it is maintained by a large community and kept up to
date. However, it has its limitations, which are discussed in the introduction. For the
majority of drives The Sleuth Kit was a useful tool but for two drives the tool failed.
2.4.2 Bypassing the System Interface (Bulk Data Analysis)
Because it is not feasible to write a program for every different type of file system, we
choose to use as our primary tool a program that bypassed the file system altogether.
We had access to a program that was able to read data from storage devices directly.
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Not only was this beneficial because it allowed us to study devices with different
file formats, but it allowed us to obtain data from unallocated space without using
additional tools. Unallocated space is the free space on a storage device. Many times
a user will write data to a storage device and delete that data. That data is not
labeled as unallocated since it can be used for new data. However, if the user has not
written new data to that space, it is still there until overwritten by new data.
The program we used to extract data is called Bulk Extractor. Bulk Extractor is an
open source tool developed at the Naval Postgraduate School that extracts a plethora
of information from digital storage devices. The program reads a hard drive from the
beginning to the end and looks for data that matches different criteria. The developers
call the functions that look for different characteristics scanners. The scanner that
we used was the email scanner that pulls anything that looks like an email address.
The program can be run on digital media directly or images of file systems. Bulk
Extractor can extract email addresses even if they are contained in compressed files
such as ZIP or PDF files. It can also extract email addressed from encrypted RAR
files.
Bulk Extractor has a histogram feature. The histogram feature shows the most
common email addresses. This is an important feature since the most common email
address can be used to infer who may own the device or what kinds of programs are
installed. When Bulk extractor finds email addresses it discovers on a drive, it also
records their address(offset) on the hard-drive. It does this from the beginning to the
end of a storage device and writes its findings in a list format to a text file. The list
includes three columns which are offset, email-address, and a small amount of data
content surrounding the email-address. This is displayed in Figure 1.1.
While Bulk Extractor does a great job in automating extractions of email addresses
there is still an issue of getting a list with too many irrelevant email addresses. An ex-
ample is a generic email used by an application such as helpdesk@thisapplication.com.
These types of email addresses may not indicate any relationships and instead are a
common email type found on any device hosting that application.
While all false positives cannot be suppressed, Bulk Extractor attempts to reduce the
number of irrelevant email addresses. Bulk Extractor conducts the suppression with
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the list of email addresses that should be disregarded. The Bulk Extractor manual
calls these lists stop lists. A stop list is a list of items that we want excluded from
being searched for on the hard drive. As these email addresses are being discovered,
users can add email addresses to the stop lists. The stop list stores the email-address
and the small amount of text that is located directly before and after the email’s
address in memory.
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The goal of our research was to ease the burden on forensic analysts, by developing
an automated means to sort through digital storage and extract social networks. We
studied scholarly papers that discussed methods, software, and research that could be
used to make our program efficient and avoid mistakes by reviewing lessons learned.
This section is a brief summary of papers that were related to our work and some
ideas that were incorporated. The papers discuss the problems in digital forensics that
created the need for the tool we built and concepts that were important to creating the
right tool. These concepts include visualization techniques, social network discovery,
email analysis, filtering irrelevant data, and cross drive analysis.
3.1 Forensic Tools Are Becoming Obsolete
Garfinkel [12], argues that in the past digital forensics was an important asset that
helped investigators solve cases quickly. However, the benefits that digital forensics
are able to offer are diminishing as other areas in technology advance. Not only is the
immense amount of digital storage a road block, but we also have various amounts of
file formats, encryption, and lack of training on programs that assist with analyzing
data. Garfinkel’s paper explains that without an increase in standardized research,
the benefits of digital forensics will be lost.
A consolidated effort from different organizations is promoted in his paper, so research
can be moved forward by better communication, documentation and teamwork. In-
stead of building forensic programs from the ground up, researchers would rather
improve upon programs already available. For an analyst it would be useful to have
a set of standards and rules, so that forensic programs can be compatible with each
other and an analyst doesn’t need to keep databases of separate results. Building
various programs from scratch is not as efficient as communities working collectively
to improve the efficiency and functionality of one program. Common file formats and
modules that build upon each other will ensure movement forward in research. That
is why Bulk Extractor is important as an initial tool for our methods. It works on
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any storage device and does not depend on a particular operating system. It is a
universal tool that can be used across platforms.
Garfinkel [13] points out a few problems with present day forensic tools. Tools are
designed to find specific information and not to assist in overall investigations. For
example, a tool may extract social security numbers but investigators may need to
know which exact social security number has been tied to numerous transactions.
Tools look for information where evidence resides on the computer system and not
where crimes were committed with computers or against computers. For example, if a
person was accused of credit card fraud, a tool may try to find evidence of credit card
numbers; instead of determining if the computer’s IP was used in the online credit
card transaction or used to remote into another system. While any given system may
not contain evidence directly they can offer clues to assist with finding the actual
evidence or insight to what issues are being analyzed, and what tools should assist
with this process in a holistic manner. We want to build a program that incorporates
a holistic methodology. We do not want investigators to extract our data and have
to provide specific email addresses they are looking for. We want the program to
provide clues and highlight relationships for them.
Another issue pointed out by Garfinkel is that tools on the market today are attempt-
ing to provide complete results with no regard to speed so they are not timely. This
means that if analysts need to obtain information quickly they may not be able to.
The last issue addressed by Garfinkel is that there is not enough on-the-job training
of digital forensic tools.
This thesis has taken these issues into consideration. This research addresses them
by using open-source tools, methods that can be performed on any operating system,
and by using holistic output that provides insight into data and does not just produce
output based on specific search queries. The processes described in this thesis outputs
information about social networks that can be useful in analysis. The information
obtained can be saved and used in other investigations.
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3.2 Visualization
Due to our ability to process visual information better than reading text, data displays
help analysts reason about data, see patterns, relationships and correlations.
Garfinkel [14] discusses how visualizations for forensic discoveries make patterns more
obvious and help to detect clusters and outliers. He suggests that the visualizations
should be created automatically using code, that each graph or chart should be unique
based on the data input. This is opposed to those created by human design, where
the input is the same but the output is unique based on the designers’ preferences.
When a program runs with the same inputs, analysts should obtain the same exact
display, and not graphs that look completely different. The is important to maintain
integrity of reports and to increase the speed at which information is being processed
and used by the analyst.
Marty [15] also discusses how visual analysis can be useful to unlock insight. The
author discusses that there is an optimal mix between human reasoning and data
mining. His paper shows that visual analytics are a promising method to help analysts
capture relevant knowledge from data exploration and thus find this optimal mix.
He warns, however, that visualization is not a panacea but that algorithms play a
vital role to support relevant data. Algorithms should help to reduce the volume
of data and highlight the most important information. Some algorithms include the
use of non-hierarchical and hierarchical visualization techniques. For non-hierarchical
approach, the author uses size and color to show the attributes of file size, creation
time, access time and modification time. For the hierarchical approach, the author
uses graphs and tree maps to demonstrate relationships and organizational structures.
Evaluation results demonstrate that visuals can increase the speed and accuracy in
finding valuable tidbits in a haystack of information.
Teerlink and Erbacher [16] discuss hierarchical and non-hierarchical visualization
techniques to reduce the amount of time needed to pick out “interesting” data. Using
visuals was an effective way for analysts to discover relevant information faster and
collect more relevant data. Teerlink and Erbacher state that on average 53% more files
were located using their techniques and that there was a 37% percent reduction in time
to locate files. In addition, their results suggest that this is an easier method because
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analysts found the first file 57% percent faster. These results were in comparison to
using the Linux command line to find files.
Shneiderman [17], discusses a tree-map method for visually displaying the size of files
on a hard drive. The paper explains that using 2D visualizations are easier to view,
and they are less data intensive than 3D visuals. The problem Shneidermann encoun-
tered was limiting the size of the trees to be displayed on a screen. He suggests that
having to scroll through too many pages or making the trees small took away from
the benefits from being able to show this information visually. He plays with different
methods to make the visual better for users in terms of speed and display. One can
certainly relate to this by doing a Google search: if the returned pages would not be
ordered based on their relevance, we would have to scroll through pages of website
and check each link. Optimization was achieved by manipulating alternative lay-
outs, copying files, trying different color displays, and calculating different functions
performed on files.
3.3 Social Networks
Rowe et al. [18] explain techniques used to discover social networks through email.
One of them includes algorithms to find sub-graphs. The sub-graphs determine what
people belong to what social groups or cliques. Determining the number of cliques a
person is a member of, is one criterion to specify if they hold a higher position on the
social ladder. In addition, being a part of a larger clique also increases the person’s
social ladder score. Email and average response time determines what cliques people
are a part of and how important they are. This thesis only deals with analysis of
local drives, but Rowe’s paper also has methods for cross-drive analysis. The cross-
drive analysis methods are explained and suggested in chapter 6, for those thinking
of continuing this research.
Campbell et al. [19] detected communities by high connectivity within a group and
low connectivity outside a group. They found connections to be high within commu-
nities and low across communities. They found that these communities corresponded
to organizations or groups on real social networks. We attempted to mirror this
technique with determining edges by the amount of emails sent between nodes.
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Bird et al. [20] raised an interesting problem, which we also encountered in reference
to email alias. It is not unusual for one person to have many email addresses and user
names. It is important when developing these graphs to not mistakenly count one
person as many people due to confusion between email addresses and activities. The
same person using different email addresses could be doing so purposely to separate
their communication between various communities. An example, would be keeping
church organization communications completely separate from fraternity organization
communications. This would be useful information to know.
The authors developed an algorithm to handle the cases of email alias. They found
that aliases had similarities. For example, it would include parts of the first and last
name. So their algorithm compared email addresses and gave them different scores.
If the scores were close enough they considered them a match and merged the email
addresses into one. They first had to normalize the email addresses and user names
by getting rid of capitalization, punctuation, and generic terms such as “admin” or
“support”. After that they proceeded to give two scores based on name similarity.
They based similarity on the Levenshtein edit distance, and if it had the initial of
the first name and complete last name or complete first name and last name initial.
They then added these scores together and made a determination. The Levenshtein
distance is a string metrics that measures the difference between two strings based
on how many edits would be necessary to change one word into the other. The last
piece of interesting information discovered by reading these papers was that they
both displayed the small world concept: while every person did not email every other
person, once you built the graph you could see a path established to everyone. So
you could reach every person in the graph through the network of users.
3.4 Email Analysis
Boucher and Kuange [21] discusses how emails are increasingly being used to obtain
information. This is because the informality and immediate response associated with
e-mail communication, causes people to let their guard down. They do not tend to
think about the fact that an e-mail, even deleted e-mails can be on their computer
system or on servers still intact for forensic analysis. The article also discussed dif-
ferent commonly used email systems. The email system that was most interesting to
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this work was the email client system. This type of system uses applications stored on
a user’s computer system. Emails are downloaded and stored on the user’s personal
computer. Examples given were Microsoft Office Outlook, Mozilla’s Thunderbird,
Windows Live Mail, Outlook Express and Eudora.
3.5 Getting Rid of Junk
As pointed out by Rowe et al. [18] many items on a hard drive do not provide foren-
sically useful information about users. These are usually operating system and ap-
plication software related information. It is important to get rid of this irrelevant
data because digital forensics has resulted in increasingly larger data sets. We need
to get rid of the uninteresting [6] so that we can focus our attention to items that will
help in an investigation. Rowe [6] eliminates uninteresting files by comparing hashes
to known uninteresting files. We attempt a similar technique by comparing unin-
teresting email addresses with known email addresses that are used for applications
and operating systems. These known email addresses come from the software Bulk
Extractor’s stop list. In addition, we were able to add additional email addresses to
the stop list from work being done by Rowe et al. [22] to discover uninteresting email
addresses. In our thesis we used the stop list from Bulk Extractor to weed out email
addresses that were not of high interest. These includes email addresses that were on
every system because they belonged to root certificates, operating system developers,
or other common application software installed on most personal computing devices.
3.6 Cross Drive Analysis
Garfinkel [14] states, “Today’s forensic examiners have become the victims of their
own success.” This is because there are more digital drives being obtained than there
are examiners or resources available to analyze the data. Examiners are currently [14]
making copies of these drives and conducting searches of each drive independently.
Garfinkel’s [14] discusses several problems with this technique. They are improper
prioritization, lost opportunity for data correlation, and improper emphasis on doc-
ument recovery. In a perfect world, examiners would be able to go directly to the
areas on the disc that are relevant to their investigation. However, since that is not
the case we talked about automation and visualization to help to help lighten the
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load. The previous techniques discussed will help alleviate the problem of improper
prioritization. The automation is used to pull out the data that investigators are
looking for and the visualization will display it in a way that investigators can make
sense of.
There is still a huge issue of time management. While these techniques save inves-
tigators time there is still a limit to how fast computer systems can process data.
While the plethora of confiscated drives continues to increase, computer systems may
take hours to image and pull valid information from each individual drive. This thesis
deals with the time management of the investigator and how we can use the technol-
ogy we have today to leverage that time. Breakthroughs in future technology will no
doubt increase the gains presented in this thesis, when computer systems are able to
process work at a faster speed.
Another problem discussed by Garfinkel is lost opportunities, this is important and
something within reach. He points out that “Because each drive is examined indepen-
dently, there is no opportunity to automatically “connect the dots”. The responsibility
is on the analyst to recognize these correlations. In this thesis, we will test our meth-
ods on individual hard drives. Experiments related to connecting correlations across
drives will be discussed in 6.2, the section on future work. Garfinkel has a simple
statistical technique to identify drives that hold more forensic value and should be
given a higher priority. He suggested downloading numerous images to a corpus and
analyzing them in unison rather than independently. This advice will be useful for
cross drive analysis work. The last problem discussed is emphasis on document recov-
ery. Garfinkel states that with the current forensics tools available on the market the
focus is on recovering lost or deleted data. He suggest that this reasoning is flawed
and that the focus should be on obtaining data that is going to further an investiga-
tion, not on every piece of data that is deleted or hidden. We took this advice and
built our methods on the philosophy of gaining information of quality (interesting
email addresses that would be relevant to social connections) and not just quantity
of email addresses extracted.
These studies highlighted the problems that we needed to focus on, when we developed
our tool for extracting social networks. The problems that we considered when we
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developed our tool were: increasing storage sizes, various file formats, visualization
burdens, removing irrelevant data, and cross drive analysis. Methods discussed in the
studies that were incorporated were visualization methods, social network techniques,
and email analysis. None of these studies attempted to create the exact tool we built
or create a method to specifically extracts email addresses based on byte-offset and
frequency between email address pairs. These papers were all useful to consider





Our primary experiment was intended to determine whether our technique of con-
structing graphs using byte-offset proximity between email addresses found on the
raw media is sufficient to reveal correlations between the addresses that are of po-
tential use in identifying and then analyzing the social network of the device owner.
Answering this question required considerable preliminary preparation: before we
could test our method we first had to generate a dataset where ground truth was
known—that is, where extracted email addresses could be reliably tagged as related
to social networks of the device owner or not. A brief outline of the steps we took to
obtain such a dataset and test our method against it follows:
1. Recruit volunteer device owners, collect their test disk images and produce
graphs.
2. Separate graphs into three bins: Useful, Not Useful, or Unclear, where “useful-
ness” indicates the presence of social-networking information.
3. Analyze the components in the various bins.
4. Conduct exit interviews with the owners to have them confirm or refute results
of our analysis.
5. Inspect graphs with unclear results and conduct further analysis.
4.1 Graph Creation
In order to create graphs of social networks a number of initial steps had to be
conducted:
1. Obtain an image of a storage device.
2. Extract the email addresses and the byte-offset of their location on the storage
device, relative to the first addressable byte on the device.
3. Construct graphs from email addresses using the addresses as nodes and placing
edges between addresses that appear within a fixed byte window. For each
graph, extract the twenty largest components.
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4. Examine the results in Gephi.
4.1.1 Obtaining Images for Analysis
We were fortunate to have three data sets to work with: the Realistic Data Corpus
drives, the Real Data Corpus, and Volunteer Drives. The images from the Realistic
Data Corpus and the Real Data Corpus were already stored on servers located at the
Naval Postgraduate School. The images from the Volunteer drives had to be collected.
These drives provided us with a real world test set with known ground truth.
Realistic Data Corpus
The Realistic Data Corpus is a dataset of storage media images created by different
groups of Naval Postgraduate Computer Science Interns [23]. This dataset was created
for digital forensic education. Some of the images were created by simply storing a
few pictures on the device and then deleting them to demonstrate that deleted data
can be restored and others were more elaborate scenarios of crimes being committed.
Scenarios included a corporation holding patents, an organization selling weapons and
the last was an organization trafficking drugs. The interns had to plant documents,
use programs, and conduct Internet searches that would support these roles. For
example images of "cats" could be considered illegal in the scenario. The Realistic
Data Corpus was a good test set because we knew what the scenarios were and could
determine if any of the characters and their accomplices were shown on our graphs.
A problem with this dataset, however, was that it was not sufficiently complex and
it was small.
Real Data Corpus
The Real Data Corpus consists of disc images collected and maintained by the Naval
Postgraduate School. The devices from which the images were taken include hard
drives, thumb drives, SD cards, and compact discs, purchased resale from thirty
different countries outside the US. This data set contains 3, 238 different drive images,
all of which were previously owned. These images contain data from their previous
users for two reasons: either the users never wiped the memory contents before resale
or their attempts to remove data were incomplete, such that fragments are still left on
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the drive. This happens because when a user "deletes” content off their devices many
operating systems do not actually remove the data. Instead the operating system
removes the method that allows users to access the address location of that data.
While, the user can no longer access the "deleted” data, their data remains written
to disk until it’s overwritten by new information.
The advantage of this dataset was that it was large and included real user data. While
it helped us make some important inferences, it was not sufficient for our purposes
because it lacked ground truth. We could not question the drive owners to see if the
actual results matched our inferences. However, the Real Data Corpus data set helped
to eliminate errors in our graph construction process and provide a large sample of
email addresses that provided no information about the drive owner’s social network.
Some examples include clusters, which contained email addresses from developers of
software and others which contained email addresses from different web pages.
Volunteer Drives
After getting IRB approval, we collected the Volunteer Drives from student and fac-
ulty volunteers recruited at the Naval Postgraduate School. Volunteers agreed to
provide their personal devices to be imaged and analyzed in connection with this re-
search. We were fortunate enough to have seven volunteers who provided ten drives.
Following the testing of the images from their personal hard drives, they were inter-
viewed. The interviews were conducted to learn more about the drives and the results
of our analysis. The volunteers are in the best position to explain who certain email
addresses belong to and if there is a connection between clusters of email addresses be-
cause the volunteers know what data they have intentionally stored on their personal
drives, who they are in contact with, who uses their devices, and what applications
they use. In addition, if further research was needed and the drive owner provided
permission we investigated the drive sectors on the original media that contained the
email addresses of which the graphs we did not understand were composed.
All of the images were from machines running proprietary operating systems. The
operating systems were various versions of Microsoft Windows or Apple’s OSX. In
order to make copies of these systems we used two imaging tools: for machines running
OSX we used the dd command line utility and for machines running Windows, we
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used FTK Imager.
4.1.2 Extracting Email Addresses
After the images were obtained we used Bulk Extractor to extract the email addresses.
We chose Bulk Extractor because it reads the hard drive in a single linear pass ignoring
the file system. We preferred this method of extracting data for two reasons. First,
it is file-system agnostic. Second, by bypassing the file system, Bulk Extractor can
look at storage locations that the file systems ignore, such as deleted data.
As previously discussed in Section 2.4.2, when users delete information from their
devices, some users assume the data is wiped away, and that is not always true.
Instead most operating systems remove a pointer to that storage location and wait
for new data to overwrite the old data. If the old data is never overwritten we can
extract it using forensic tools. This behavior is a benefit to us, since it allowed us
to extract email addresses from these hidden locations. Another nice feature of Bulk
Extractor is its ability to decompress compressed data and to produce the email
addresses from these compressed files. With other tools, artifacts stored inside the
compressed data would be overlooked, which might cause a failure to match the email
address patterns we are looking for.
We are only interested in two of the output files produced by Bulk Extractor. The first
is the email.txt file, which contains the extracted byte offset on the storage device,
and a few bits of content stored before and after the email address. The second file
we are interested in, is the email_histogram.txt file, which contains a histogram of
all the email addresses and their frequencies.
Bulk Extractor also has the ability to accept a stop list. We used the stop_content.txt
stop list available with the Bulk Extractor release at Digital Corpora [24]. This stop
list was created by running Bulk Extractor on drives from the National Software
Library in 2014. Using a stop list is important because many email addresses, such as
the email addresses of developers who helped to create software on the device, were
not relevant to the types of networks we were looking to study.
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4.1.3 Constructing Graphs From Addresses and Byte Offsets
Once we had the list of email addresses from Bulk Extractor’s email.txt file and their
byte-offset from Bulk Extractor we were able to process the data in order to create
our social network graphs. We processed the data by looking at each email address
and its byte-offset on the hard drive compared to every other email address located
within the byte window. We tested a distance of 128 bytes and 256 bytes.
We then created a graph by using these email addresses as nodes. If the email address
was within the byte window size of the next email address, we placed an edge between
the two email addresses and considered that pair of email addresses as connected. We
counted the number of times that a pair of email addresses showed up on the same
hard drive, and assigned edge weights equal to this count. Of the two byte window
sizes, 128 bytes seemed to be more reasonable. Graphs obtained using the 256 byte
window did not provide any additional useful information. On the contrary these
graphs had to be further filtered to ensure that they only displayed the most relevant
nodes. Otherwise there were too many nodes to quickly sort through.
We accounted for email addresses that had been compressed by making them into
their own graph. These email addresses were compressed with each other because
they were part of the same files and/or folders. That means they originally had a
connection and it made sense that we should ensure they are part of the same graph
when attempting to construct social networks.
The above process of translating Bulk Extractor output to Gephi-readable graphs
was automated by a program we called Betographer, which we created for this thesis
project. We chose Python as the programming language because it supports a number
of software packages that have been useful to our research such as NetworkX, which
provides various methods of creating, storing and studying complex networks with
many nodes and edges.
In addition, Betographer has the ability to break the graph of an entire hard drive into
more manageable components by only returning components that have the highest
number of nodes. We used this function to extract the top 20 components of each
drive, which we reviewed in the exit interviews with the volunteers. Since the code
is not currently available for public release, a copy of Betographer can be found in
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Appendix A.
4.1.4 Visualizing the Data
Once graphs were created, we used Gephi to obtain a visual representation of the data
and further manipulate the results. We realized that if the graphs did not highlight
the most important information analysts would not use them. Therefore, we wanted
to provide an aesthetically pleasing and useful format for analysts. Furthermore, we
wanted a method that was intuitive and consistent so analyst reviewing the graphs
could easily compare different graphs. It is difficult to recognize the same graph when
two different visual layouts are used. In addition, we wanted our layout to minimize
edge crossings so that the results did not look like a ball of yarn, and to spread out
nodes so that their distance from other nodes was relative to how connected they were.
So, if two email addresses have never been connected they should be placed far apart
but addresses with many connections should be closer together on the graph. Finally,
we wanted to spread the graph across a 2-dimensional plane so that the graphs would
not appear too busy in any one area of the screen.
Based on these criteria, the layouts we believed were the most useful for our data and
pleasing to the eye were Fruchterman-Reingold [25] and Force Atlas 2 [26]. These
algorithms are force-directed: they work by giving the nodes opposing forces so all
the nodes repulse each other. The more connections they have, i.e., the higher the
weight of the edge between two nodes, the less they repulse each other. This causes
nodes with high edge weights to appear near to each other on the graph. The total
distance between nodes depends on the number of nodes in the graph and the total
available space. The algorithm tries to spread out connected nodes as far as the given
working space allows, so that nodes are not right on top of each other and can be
seen clearly. The two layouts differ in the amount of empty space with which they
surround the nodes, the exact distance between nodes and the values of the forces
of attraction and repulsion. For comparison Figure 4.1 shows the same graph using
both layouts.
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(a) Realistic Data Corpus Drive with
Fruchterman-Reingold Layout
(b) Realistic Date Corpus Drive with
Force Atlas 2 Layout
Figure 4.1: Demonstration of Two Topologies used to Display Graphs.
4.2 Separating the Graphs into Bins
After the graphs were produced we analyzed them and separated them into different
bins based on our findings. The steps we took to separate the graphs were as follows:
1. Calculate the total nodes and weights for all graphs.
2. Employ a k-core filter to identify the core of the graphs (see Section 2.1.1)
3. Visually inspect the content of the graphs for contents.
4. Sample nodes and attempt to understand them by investigating their sources
on the original media.
5. Separate graphs into three different categories: Useful, Unclear, Not Useful.
After we created the graphs for each drive we began our analysis on them. We
recorded the number of nodes and edges for each graph. If the graph had more
than 200 nodes we filtered it to the core and analyzed the core. For the data in
the Realistic Data Corpus we compared our results with the facts surrounding the
various scenarios. For the data obtained from the Real Data Corpus we conducted
Internet research to see if there was public information supporting the connections
between the email addresses in our clusters. For the data obtained from volunteers
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we visually inspected the graphs, separated the graphs into bins based on what we
knew about the drive owner, and later confirmed our results in the exit interview.
The graphs that were clear were graphs that contained user-names that were actual
names and top level domains that are typically used for personal email like “Gmail”
or “Yahoo”. If we were not sure of a top level domain we conducted Internet research
to see if the top level domain was an institution or agency. Graphs that were clearly
not useful were those that contained developer email addresses or generic user-names
such as no-reply@thisdomain.com. There were some graphs that we could not clearly
label. Those we attempted to confirm with the drive owner or conduct further forensic
testing.
Our "Useful" bin included graphs that looked like they showed characteristics of true
social networks. According to Slawski [27] the global top ten top level domain names
(TLD) are ".com", ".org", ".edu", ".gov", ".uk", ".net", ".ca", and ".de". If the
graphs contained at least 75% of nodes with these TLD then we considered them likely
to be part of a social network. We also reviewed the graphs to determine if the range
of nodes were realistic. For instance, it is unlikely that a graph with 100, 000 nodes
represents a true social network. Most people do not frequently communicate with
100, 000 other people. According to Hampton et al. [28], the average American has a
Social Network of 634 contacts, those who use the Internet and cell phones having a
higher number of connections respectively. The average number of Facebook friends
for any one user is 338 and the median is 200 [29]. In addition, anthropologist and
evolutionary psychologists Robin Dunbar, has done research on how many people can
be in a person’s Social Network [30]. The numbers were a range of 100−200 for casual
friends to no more than 1500 for those people who especially adept at remembering
names to match to the faces. These statistics convinced us that components or
subgraphs that represent social networks should have approximately 200 nodes or
less. In cases where our graphs contained more nodes, we employed techniques to
attempt to isolate the components at the core.
The "Unclear" bin included graphs that we were unsure about. They included top
level domains from foreign countries such as ".ru" and ".lu". While these may be
common and expected on the foreign drives they were not expected to be seen in the
drives from our American volunteers. The domain names and user-names were also
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questionable. They tended to be names that could be valid users. Examples include
items such as freezer_deep@clown.ms or timothy@y7sadhj.net. For privacy issues, we
are not using any of the actual email addresses found on the drives but these examples
are similar in syntax to our findings. If the user did not know where the graphs came
from, we conducted further analysis with the drive owner’s permission. The analysis
performed included Internet searches and using The Sleuth Kit to identify which file
name and path the nodes came from. If the graph’s origin was determined we changed
its bin category. However, in many cases these results still were not clear and we had
to leave them for future work.
The "Not Useful" bin included graphs that we were confident were not the type of
social networks that we were interested in. These graphs did include some social
networks but they were not the networks of the drive owners or their comrades.
The social networks discovered in this category were groups of programmers such as
developers for Microsoft, C++ libraries, Ubuntu, many other software programs and
email subscriptions. An example is a graph of Microsoft developers shown in Figure
4.2. Some graphs were from groups such as Navy Times, who send out emails to
their members. While this does not demonstrate their personal social network it is
interesting because it identifies an organization they are associated with. Table 5.2
in our analysis chapter shows the count of graphs from the volunteer drives based on
the categories: "Useful", "Unclear" and "Not Useful".
4.3 Analysis of Components Assigned to the “Use-
ful,” “Not Useful,” and “Unclear” Bins
After we separated the graphs into different bins, we conducted varying levels of
analysis on each bin. The following outlines the approach we took with each bin:
1. Calculate Centrality, Modularity, Weight and Degree for Graphs in the "Useful"
bin.
2. Conduct Cross Drive Analysis for Graphs in the "Not Useful" bin to discover
similar graphs across drives.
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Figure 4.2: Component of Microsoft Developers: This component demon-
strates a graph that was placed in the "Not Useful" bin, but could be used
in future works to conduct fingerprinting. It was found on drives 2, 6, 9,
and 10 as the third and/or fourth component. The components respective
ID numbers are d2c3, d9c3, d6c4, and d10c3. We were able to label the
developers job descriptions by conducting web searches.
For graphs that were useful we filtered the graph to the k-core, which always happened
to have less than 200 nodes when filtered (except in the case of a component from
a drive belonging to a web-server administrator) and began calculating statistics.
We calculated the closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality,
modularity, degree and weight for each node. We also calculated the average degree,
average weighted degree, network diameter, graph density, modularity, and average
clustering co-efficient for each graph. For graphs that were unclear we only conducted
this additional analysis if, during the exit-interview, drive owners confirmed that these
graphs were useful and explained who the email addresses belonged to. For graphs
that were not useful we conducted visual inspections to determine if similar graphs
were present on other drives, and tagged these graphs to be used in future works
such as the graph in Figure 4.2. Our criteria for determining similarity was based on
having a majority of nodes with the same email addresses across storage devices. A
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limitation of our approach is that we could not be completely certain that there were
no good addresses in graphs labeled as "Not Useful" and we did not develop criteria
for identifying not useful graphs automatically. Though the creation of a classification
algorithm is beyond the scope of the current work, we labeled these datasets for use by
future researchers in developing a systematic approach to distinguish between Useful
and Not Useful graphs.
4.4 Obtaining Ground Truth with Exit Interviews
The exit interview consisted of verifying whether we were accurate in our determi-
nation of which graphs represented social networks. To answer this question, we
compared the information from the exit interviews with the inferences we made be-
fore talking with the drive owners. The goal during these interviews was to discover
whether the clusters represented real world relationships between individuals, or if
not, whether there was some other type of noteworthy relationship that the compo-
nent captured, such as a cluster of log-in addresses for access to a particular applica-
tion. In addition, we wanted to gain insight into the mechanism by which errors were
introduced in the graphs for example, nodes that are incorrectly identified as email
addresses due to the inclusion of an "@" symbol, or find email addresses that were
not important and could be disregarded; for example, email addresses from operating
system developers were not considered interesting for purposes of our research, but
their email addresses are valid and they form a social network as well.
We took the following approach:
1. Create PowerPoint presentation and data tables displaying results.
2. Question drive owners about storage device.
3. Verify results with drive owners.
4. Request permission for further analysis of a drive if some results were unclear.
We first created a Powerpoint Presentation and a data table for all the "Useful"
components. The PowerPoint Presentations contained all 20 components from the
drive owner’s storage media and the data collected in Tables 5.1 and 5.4. The
data tables for "Useful" components contained metrics on degree, weighted degree,
eccentricity, closeness, betweenness, modularity class, and eigencentrality for each
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node in components that were filtered to the core if they contained more than 200
nodes. We sat down with the drive owners and showed them the graphs that we
tagged as useful and confirmed whether we were accurate or not. We asked whether
they had email clients, since this factor could influence the number of email addresses
stored on their hard drives. We also showed them the nodes from "Useful" graphs
ranked by betweenness and eigenvector scores to determine which accurately reflected
the rankings of associates. We then showed them a sample of the nodes from graphs
that we tagged as "Unclear" and "Not Useful." If they recognized the samples we
continued our line of questioning to determine what applications were causing graphs
that were not social networks. If the "Unclear" graphs were determined to be "Useful"
we changed the tag and proceeded with the same line of analysis and questioning as
graphs originally tagged as "Useful." Finally, we encouraged drive owners to provide
any additional information or suggestions that they believed would be useful to our
research or could clarify our results. A full list of our interview questions is available
in Appendix C.1. For the components that were still in the "Unclear" bin we asked
permission from the drive owner to conduct further forensic testing in an attempt to
obtain additional information about the components.
After the comparison, we recorded three statistics: false positives (graphs that we
had labeled "Useful", which interviews revealed to be "Not Useful", false negatives
(graphs we labeled as "Not Useful" which interviews revealed to be "Useful", and true
positives. Due to constraints on interviewer time, we did not perform an exhaustive
review of the "Not Useful" graphs, especially in cases where the origin of the email
addresses in the graph was easily determined. We therefore omit a true negative
category, since we do not have complete verification of all graphs in this bin. Once
the true relationships of the clusters were established, we recorded how many of
these inferences were correct and how many were not. This was important because
analysts would not always be able to talk to the drive owners to verify their results.
So it was important that we could infer valid relationships reading the graphs alone.
Trends that signaled true negatives were documented for future work on automation
techniques to remove noise from the results. The results of this analysis are discussed
in Section 5.5.
There were many instances where the relationships were unclear and we had to inves-
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tigate further. The owners of the drives often could not explain why clusters of email
addresses were found on their drives. Some email addresses were not recognized by
the owners at all. We used The Sleuth Kit to investigate the surrounding circum-
stances of unknown email addresses and establish evidence to support why they were
on the drive.
4.5 Further Testing Conducted
Results in the "Unclear" category tended to receive this label because we could not
determine which application produced the email addresses or whether the email ad-
dresses were actual email addresses or just strings that displayed similar properties
to email addresses. As previously mentioned, we attempted to question the drive
owners about these graphs but in the cases where the drive owners could not provide
definitive answers, we took the following steps:
1. Used The Sleuth Kit to recover files.
2. Inspect hex dumps to read context surrounding nodes of interest.
We used The Sleuth Kit to recover the files that were associated with components
of interest. Once we recovered the files we used the file name and path to determine
what applications were associated with "Unclear" components. If we discovered the
file name and still had questions we performed a hex dump of the file and attempted
to discover whether the file contents provided any helpful clues. Graphs where this
process did not provide additional insight were left in the "Unclear" bin.
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In this chapter, we discuss the results of our experiments and the analysis we con-
ducted. We begin with the Real and Realistic Data Corpus, proceed to the Volunteer
Drive dataset. After discussing the experiments and analysis, we provide a synopsis
of the most interesting graphs. Finally, we examine the effectiveness of well-known
centrality measures at predicting the relative importance of members in our social
networks.
5.1 Results From the Real Data Corpus and the Re-
alistic Data Corpus
Our preliminary analysis of the Realistic Data Corpus and Real Data Corpus drives
revealed some general characteristics of the drives, such as what operating systems
or programs were installed. An example is shown in Figure 5.1, demonstrating a
component that indicates Ubuntu was installed on the storage media. Because this
image was from the Realistic Data Corpus [23] we were able to confirm our results.
In addition, we found components that “looked like” valid social networks based on
the top level domains in the addresses, and whether the user-names were valid names
or generic handles such as “no-reply”. However, for the Real Data Corpus we could
not determine whether the networks were created from actual associates of the drive
owner, since we did not have actual drive users to verify the information. Note that, in
the interest of protecting the privacy of the original device owners, we do not include a
graph that demonstrates this problem. On the Realistic Data Corpus drives we were
able to confirm that some of the heavily weighted nodes matched the characters in the
scenario. An example is shown in Figure 5.2, where there were four main characters
in this particular scenario. The characters were CEO Pat McGoo, IT administrator
Terry Johnson, and two patent researchers Jo Smith and Charlie Brown [31].
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Figure 5.1: Component from UBNIST1: UBNIST1 is a drive from the Realis-
tic Data Corpus. Displayed is the 3rd component from this drive. UBNIST1
was created from a USB memory stick that contains a bootable copy of
Ubuntu 8.10 Linux [23]. Without referring to the history of the drive we
could tell Ubuntu was installed based on the domain of the nodes. The
component displayed is unfiltered.
5.2 Analysis of Aggregate Statistics on Graphs from
Volunteer Drives
Table 5.1 presents basic information from the drives that we analyzed. We assigned
ID d1 through d10 to each graph in the data set, corresponding to the ten drives from
which the graphs were created. Components of a graph are referred to by their graph
ID concatenated with the letter c and a number corresponding to the component’s
relative size within the graph—that is, c1 is the largest component, c2 the second
largest, etc. Thus d1 refers to the entire graph produced from the first volunteer
drive, and d1c19 refers to the 19th largest component of that graph, if there is one.
As mentioned previously the nodes are the email addresses discovered on the drives
and the edges are a relationship between those nodes. Relationships are said to occur
if the email pairs are discovered within 128 bytes
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Figure 5.2: Component from terry-2009-12-11-001.E01: This image is from
the m47 patents scenario. The image is part of the Realistic Data Corpus.
Displayed is the 2nd component from this image. The component displayed
is unfiltered. The nodes with the thickest edge weights belong to the main
characters of the scenario.
The last two columns of Table 5.1 give the percentages of nodes and edges that
were analyzed in relation to the total number of nodes and edges on the graphs
built from the drive. While we only analyze a small percentage of the nodes, we are
able to analyze the majority of the edges. For our research it was not important
to analyze all the email addresses on the storage medium. Instead, we needed to
examine the addresses that had links to other addresses. We are seeking to determine
relationships between email addresses, and that is accomplished by extracting and
analyzing a majority of the edges on the storage medium. The large number of
unexamined nodes is indicative of the fact that most of these were singletons, or part
of very small components.
Attempting to view a graph of an entire storage device was not useful unless the graph
held less than 200 nodes. It is similar to trying to hear a choir of 30 people while
100, 000 people are singing different songs at the same time. The most important
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Graph ID Operating System Drive Capacity # of Nodes # of Edges % of Nodes Studied % of Edges Studied
d1 OSX 320G 55030 68594 30% 77.5%
d2 Windows 10 100G 25101 30472 43.86% 89.99%
d3 OSX 500G 105457 172013 25.57% 43.19%
d4 OSX 320G 105482 107203 27.1% 69.82%
d5 Windows 8 20G 885 95 8.93% 83.16%
d6 Windows 8 460G 98086 458255 31.16% 80.21%
d7 Windows 7 500G 29727 50323 45.05% 95.03%
d8 Ubuntu/BackTrack 200G 42452 43535 35.75% 88.39%
d9 Windows 7 Enterprise 400G 2623 969 23.60% 95.15%
d10 Windows 7 Enterprise 150G 52327 74952 41.28% 88.24%
Table 5.1: Drive Capacity & Extracted Information for Volunteer Drives.
Note that d5 and d6 were obtained from the same laptop; d5 was a small
SSD and d6 was a larger magnetic spinning disk. The user stated that the
laptop had dual hard drives so that the OS could be stored on the SSD for
quicker data retrieval. However, upon analysis the OS was discovered on the
HDD and not the SSD. The entry in the OS for d8 indicates that it originally
had Ubuntu installed; subsequently the drive owner re-imaged the computer
and installed BackTrack as the new OS.
nodes do not stand out when there are thousands of nodes or more. Furthermore,
during testing when we attempted to run a layout algorithm on networks with over
100, 000 nodes, Gephi would crash. We ran Gephi on a computer with an 8GB of
RAM, which allowed us to reconfigure Gephi to use 2800MB of memory; this helped
with some graphs of tens of thousands of nodes, but does not represent a scalable
solution. In addition, Gephi documentation states that the program was built for
graphs up to 100, 000 nodes [32], which explains why graphs above this number tended
to crash.
This is why we did not attempt to visualize a graph of the entire drive and instead
broke them down into 20 components each, as described in Section 4.1.3. These graphs
were chosen by the highest number of nodes. Because all nodes in a component must
be connected by at least one path, membership in the same component implies a
relationship. In Table B.1 we show the node and edge count of the top 20 graphs of
each drive, with their node and edge count.
The top component of each drive contained an average of 12, 774 nodes with a range
between 10 and 28, 658. For the second largest component, that number was drasti-
cally reduced to an average of 2, 678 nodes with a range between 8 and 10, 192 nodes.
46
Both the average number of nodes and the range fell off rapidly: for the 20th com-
ponent the average was 23 nodes and the range was between 2 and 38. In a similar
trend, the top component for each drive averaged 64, 089 edges with a range between
24 and 365, 054 edges, but this number dropped to an average of 9, 045 edges with a
range between 7 and 39, 406 for the 2nd component and an average of 41 edges with
a range between 1 and 66 edges for the 20th component. These results indicate that
the majority of email addresses and relationships between email address pairs will be
discovered within the top 20 components.
Graph ID Useful Unclear Not Useful
d1 1 5 14
d2 1 4 15
d3 2 13 5
d4 3 14 3
d5 8 0 12
d6 0 9 11
d7 2 0 18
d8 1 0 19
d9 3 0 17
d10 1 0 19
Table 5.2: Number of Social Networks Discovered on Graphs: The “Useful”
bin contains components that displayed social networks, the “Unclear” bin
contains components that drive owners were unsure of and our Internet
searches and forensic testing did not produce clear results, the “Not Useful”
bin contains components that did not display social networks. The “Not
Useful” bin contained items that included applications and developer email
addresses. It was interesting that d5 contained many useful components
while d6 did not contain any. Drive 5 was a SSD and drive 6 was a HDD.
We wanted to determine what statistical scores assigned to the graphs best reflected
social network groups. Table 5.3 is a table of the statistics taken for each drive before
any filtering was applied. We had twenty graphs per drive but most graphs did not
represent social networks. Table 5.2 shows the number of components that fell into
each of our bins across all drives. With the exception of d6, all the drives contained
some social networks within the first 3 components. As indicated previously, compo-
nents are sorted by node count, from largest to smallest. Table 5.3 shows all graphs
that did represent actual social networks as confirmed by the drive owner. In our
informal preliminary analysis, we detected no single metric that correlated clearly
with social networks. There were many usernames and domains that appeared to be
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valid social networks but having above 200 nodes added to the noise, which made it
difficult to quickly determine those email addresses that were closely associated. We
did not collect statistics on “Not Useful” components. A more systematic classifica-
tion scheme across a larger dataset may be more revealing; however, this first requires
our methodology to be extended to a larger number of volunteers.
Note that metrics for components extracted from d5 are somewhat atypical, in that
they have scores of 0 for several of the columns. The primary reason is due to the
small number of email addresses discovered in each component of d5. As mentioned,
d5 was a small capacity SSD which is believed to hold caches of user data based on the
contents of its components and forensic testing. We attempted to actually find these
email addresses by using the OS but they were inaccessible through the file system
and upon conducting forensic testing we discovered they were located in unallocated
space.
Component ID Nodes Core Average Degree Average Weighted Degree Diameter Density Modularity Average Clustering Coefficient Average Path Length
d1c2 6087 19 8.82 29.19 51 0.10% 75.30% 44.40% 5.23
d2c2 867 8 4.08 53.40 22 0.50% 43.00% 29.90% 4.40
d3c1 24075 22 5.37 29.36 196 0.00% 62.40% 58.90% 10.51
d3c17 39 3 3.13 3.13 24 8.20% 69.90% 54.30% 8.94
d4c2 10192 6 7.70 30.00 134 0.10% 77.50% 48.20% 6.85
d4c4 328 14 7.70 23.00 8 2.40% 72.80% 47.10% 3.66
d4c7 123 2 2.72 5.43 37 2.20% 84.20% 57.70% 12.87
d5c1 10 4 4.80 8.00 4 53.30% 17.20% 72.20% 1.69
d5c5 6 1 4.67 3.00 2 33.30% 0.00% 0.00% 1.67
d5c6 5 1 1.60 6.80 2 0.40% 0.00% 0.00% 1.60
d5c7 4 1 1.50 1.50 2 0.50% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50
d5c9 3 1 1.33 2.00 2 0.67% 0.00% 0.00% 1.33
d5c14 3 2 2.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% 100% 1.00
d5c17 2 1 1.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% N/A 1.00
d5c20 2 1 1.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% N/A 1.00
d7c1 534 5 3.07 8.98 16 0.60% 59.80% 76.90% 3.25
d7c2 9 3 4.67 4.67 3 58.30% 20.40% 76.30% 1.50
d8c2 1630 5 2.81 18.82 96 0.20% 49.50% 30.60% 8.16
d9c1 7655 3 2.40 14.07 12 8.30% 59.90% 14.10% 5.01
d9c4 233 4 5.64 11.40 65 2.40% 83.60% 60.50% 23.78
d9c11 30 3 2.55 12.36 11 12.10% 47.40% 22.40% 4.60
d10c1 19953 21 5.33 42.48 69 0.20% 95.00% 59.20% 24.72
Table 5.3: Metrics Collected from Graphs that were Social Networks
Even after separating graphs into components, some graphs were still in excess of
200 nodes. To reduce this number to a more manageable level we filtered the graphs
to their core, after which the social network graphs were no more than 200 nodes,
with the exception only of d9c1. These statistics are displayed in Table 5.4. This
component d9c1 still has more than 200 nodes but it displays more than one social
network that needs to be separated. The drive owner of Component d9c1 was an
administrator for an email server, and would receive emails and error messages for
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Component ID Nodes Edges Average Degree Average Weighted Degree Diameter Density Modularity Average Clustering Coefficient Average Path Length
d1c2 50 650 26.00 166.52 2 0.53% .496% .59% 1.47
d2c2 10 43 8.60 23.00 2 0.96% .08% .95% 1.04
d3c1 37 532 28.76 2189.78 2 .80% .05% .83% 1.20
d3c17 39 3 3.13 3.13 24 8.20% 69.90 % 54.30% 8.94
d4c2 20 159 15.9 254.30 2 0.001% .21% .84% 1.16
d4c4 77 267 6.94 19.80 6 .091% .643% .44% 3.03
d4c7 123 2 2.72 5.43 37 2.20% 84.20% 57.70% 12.87
d5c1 10 4 4.80 8.00 4 53.30% 17.20% 72.20% 1.69
d5c5 6 1 4.67 3.00 2 33.30% 0.00% 0.00% 1.67
d5c6 5 1 1.60 6.80 2 0.40% 0.00% 0.00% 1.60
d5c7 4 1 1.50 1.50 2 0.50% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50
d5c9 3 1 1.33 2.00 2 0.67% 0.00% 0.00% 1.33
d5c14 3 2 2.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% 100% 1.00
d5c17 2 1 1.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% N/A 1.00
d5c20 2 1 1.00 4.00 1 100% 0.00% N/A 1.00
d7c1 6 15 5 14.33 1 1% 0% 1% 1
d7c2 9 3 4.67 4.67 3 58.30% 20.40% 76.30% 1.50
d8c2 56 205 7.321 87.429 7 .13% .484% .70% 3.49
d9c1 1240 13353 21.537 412.839 5 .02% .82% 39% 2.96
d9c4 54 149 5.52 11.19 10 .10% .69% .65% 3.57
d9c11 30 3 2.55 12.36 11 12.10% 47.40% 22.40% 4.60
d10c1 33 447 27.09 3215.21 2 .85% .25% .85% 1.15
Table 5.4: Metrics Collected from Social Networks Discovered on Disk Im-
ages after Filtering to the Graph Core, for components containing more than
200 nodes.
all clients on the server. Attempting to separate graphs similar to these into email
clusters and communities could be a subject of future research. Metrics for all cores
are displayed in Table 5.4.
For most of the graphs, filtering to the core and recording edge weights provided
enough information to get a sense of the drive owners close associates (non-extended
family members, friends, coworkers in the same department) but for others it was
beneficial to decrease the k value to a few degrees below the core. For example, in
Component d2c2 the core showed members of the drive owner’s soccer team. However,
for that drive if the k-value was reduced by one members of the drive owner’s family
started to emerge. The same can be said for Component d4c2. At the core this graph
displayed business associates; once the k-core was reduced family members started to
appear.
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5.3 Comparison of Researcher Inferences with Ground
Truth for Graphs Determined from Volunteer
Drives
We obtained encouraging results with our new method for analyzing relationships
between email addresses, despite being cautious when classifying components as “Not
Useful.” While the precision was only .5 our recall was .955. Meaning, of compo-
nents that we initially labeled social networks, only 50% were confirmed during the
interviews. However, less than 1% of true social networks discovered were labeled
incorrectly. Our negative predictive value was much higher at 0.991. That is, of the
components we initially labeled as not being social networks, 99% were confirmed by
the interviews. We calculated these scores ignoring components classified as “Unclear”,
because we were unable to determine whether components classified as “Unclear” rep-
resented valid email addresses. Table 5.5 shows a confusion matrix of our results.
The one component that we incorrectly classified as not being a social network was
d9c11. All domain names in Component d9c11 (except the drive owner’s email ad-
dress) belonged to one particular business. We incorrectly labeled it as "Not Useful"
for the same characteristics that made it actually useful. Our initial assumption was
that components overly dominated with organizational names came from applications
or web-services.
Ground Truth After Exit-Interviews
Useful Not Useful Total
Researcher Inferences Useful 21 21 21 + 21Not Useful 1 112 1 + 112
Total 21 + 1 21 + 112 N = 155
Table 5.5: Confusion Matrix displaying actual and predicted values for com-
ponents that demonstrated social networks and those that did not. Note,
that components that were unclear were excluded from this table.
5.4 Structural Analysis of Selected Graphs from Vol-
unteer Drives
In this section we will highlight some of the most interesting graphs we encountered.
We start with two graphs, d3c1 and d8c2, that demonstrate classic properties of
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social networks. We move on to discuss d5c1, a component comprised exclusively
of usernames belonging to the drive owner and the drive owner’s close associates.
Next we examine d2c2, d4c2, and d1c2, three graphs that show internal communities,
followed by d9c1, which shows many networks within the same component. Finally,
we show a graph, d4c4, constructed from identifiers that were extracted directly from
the local cache of a social networking application.
We begin with component d3c1, displayed in Figure 5.3. This component shows
university professors who were employees of the same department. The drive owner
used two email clients: Mutt and Outlook for Mac. The drive owner stated that
the mail clients were only used to send university related emails. The drive owner’s
spouse used the computer to send and receive web based mail. None of the spouses
email addresses were stored locally, however, and they were not discovered in any of
our graphs. The drive owner suggested that a few of the email addresses found were
from professors that had not been emailed in years. Since email clients store data
persistently and locally, the storage media could potentially have this information for
years, while web based email stores data remotely and usually writes data to a local
cache, which is quickly overwritten. This evidence leads us to believe that these email
addresses were made available due to the drive owners use of email clients.
This component demonstrates several properties that are characteristic of social net-
works. First, the core of the graph corresponds closely with the drive owner’s closest
associates, and collaborators. Although the whole component includes many co-
workers in the same organization, the core contains only the owner’s close collabora-
tors and members of his home department. Second, the owner was easily identifiable
visually because of high degree and high weight edges connecting to other important
members of the department. Finally, measures such as Eigenvector Centrality and
Betweenness Centrality create a ranking that accurately places the drive owner and
his supervisors at the top of the list. We discuss the effectiveness of these measures
further in Section 5.5.
Component d8c2 shared many of the same properties as d3c1. The drive owner was
president of a home owners associate board. The graph shown in Figure 5.4, produced
from component d8c2, displays relationships between neighbors who were members of
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Figure 5.3: Component d3c1: Displays a network of Professors employed
at the same University. The graph is colored by degree. The modularity
class was the same for every node in this component. The modularity of the
graph was low at .049 and the edge weights were extremely high compared
to other graphs studied. The average edge weights were 2189.78. Further
statistics for this graph are given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
the board. The drive owner frequently received emails from his neighbors. The edges
with heavy weights connect nodes representing the drive owner, the owner’s spouse
and a neighbor who was also a co-worker and succeeded the drive owner as board
president. As in Figure 5.3, the most important figures in the network are rapidly
identifiable by visual inspection based on edge weight and degree.
The presence of multiple email addresses representing the same person is a common
occurrence, and in some components this feature dominates the entire graph. Com-
ponent d5c1, shown in Figure 5.5, shows an example of this phenomenon. The graph
contains only email addresses frequently used as usernames to log into various online
applications. The drive owner stated that while most of the email addresses did belong
to the drive owner, others included the owner’s mother, mother-in-law, and spouse.
The drive owner states that they did not use any of their email addresses to send email
messages to their mother or mother-in-law. These email addresses were mostly likely
stored when they logged into online applications that required a username. Many of
the nodes are the same exact email address with a small prefix concatenated to the
front of the email address such as “email”, “eml_address” and “emailContactAddress”.
This component was interesting because it demonstrated that work could be done
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Figure 5.4: Component d8c2: Displays a network of members of a neigh-
borhood board for which the drive owner had previously served as president.
The core (at k = 5) displayed 56 nodes with 205 edges. Heavy edge weights
connected the drive owner and spouse, as well as the drive owner and the
board president who succeeded the owner. The multiple nodes labeled drive
owner are a result of multiple email addresses. The nodes are colored by
modularity class. Further statistics for this graph are given in tables 5.4 and
5.3
to discover email addresses that individuals use as usernames to log onto different
applications.
Figure 5.5: Component d5c1: Displays a network of email addresses used to
log into online application by using these email addresses as the username.
Further statistics for this graph are given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 differ from graphs presented so far in that they display
53
components that can be broken up easily into smaller communities. In addition, these
components were more interesting when k-core value was reduced to include more
nodes that just the core. Both of these characteristics can be seen in component
d2c2, displayed in Figure 5.6. This drive owner used Outlook and Yahoo to send
and receive mail. The thick edges were connect nodes representing the drive owners,
the coach, and a teammate who responded to team messages more than others. The
drive owner explained that he did not frequently send emails to the team but was
a recipient of these group messages. This graph is notable in that it provides an
example of a situation where a noisy sub-community can create a distorted image
of the owner’s social network by overwhelming other communities. For most of the
graphs we inspected, nodes outside the core they tended to be email addresses from
people or agencies that the drive owner was in contact with less frequently. However,
in this graph, although the core occurred at k = 8, the 7-Core also included useful
information—in particular, nodes that represented friends and family of the drive
owner. Even though the drive owner’s family was outside the core, they still appeared
at the top of the ranking produced according to the centrality measures we ran, when
k-value was reduced. Again, see Section 5.5 for further discussion of the effectiveness
of centrality measures.
Nodes Modularity Class Degree Weighted Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector
Drive Owner 0 8 22 .9 .125 .906
Heavy Communicator 1 1 9 29 1.0 .25 1.0
Heavy Communicator 2 1 9 21 1.0 .25 1.0
Player A 1 9 29 1.0 .25 1.0
Player B 1 9 27 1.0 .25 1.0
Player C 1 9 25 1.0 .25 1.0
Player D 1 9 25 1.0 .25 1.0
Player E 1 8 19 .9 .125 .91
Player F 1 8 17 .9 .125 .91
Player G 1 8 16 .9 .125 .91
Table 5.6: Statistics for Individual Nodes of a Soccer Team, Filtered to the
Core
Component d4c2, shown in Figure 5.7 shows a group of friends, family, coworkers, and
classmates. As with component d2c2, we lost vital information when we restricted
our examination to the core of the network (at k = 14). We illustrate this by showing
the core and the 10-core side by side in Figure 5.7. The graph at its core displayed
a network of the owner’s classmates, and when dropped to k-core 12-13 additional
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(a) 8-Core of Component d2c2 (b) 7-Core of Component d2c2
Figure 5.6: Component d2c2: Displays a network of soccer teammates.
Once filtered to the core at k=8, it displayed 10 nodes—all members of the
same soccer team. The teammates who emailed the group most frequently
are labeled as heavy communicators. The nodes are colored by modularity
class. Below in table 5.6 are some calculations used to compare nodes.
When the core was reduced to 7 the graph increased to 51 nodes and the
drive owner’s family members started to emerge. Further statistics for this
graph are given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
classmates were added to the graph; these are all colored in light blue. At k-core 11
the drive owners co-workers and associates were added to the graph, colored light and
dark green respectively. The associates were people the drive owner knew but did not
consider close friends. At k-core 10 close family members and friends were added; they
are displayed in orange. At this core, displayed in pink, are other students who attend
the same university as the drive owner. However, the drive owner did not know these
students personally and believed they were on the hard-drive due to being part of the
same distribution lists from school administrators. Similarly to d2c2, even though the
drive owner’s family was outside the core, they showed up at the top of Centrality
measures, when k-value was reduced. An example of the Centrality measures for this
drive is in Table 5.7.
Below a k-core of 10, a large number of email addresses were introduced that the drive
owner did not recognize. As in components previously discussed the heavy edges did
in fact represent people the user communicated with most often. Also, here again
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(a) The network at the core (b) The network with k = 10
Figure 5.7: Component d4c2: Displays the drive owner’s associates. In
figure (a) the graph is filtered to the core, which was 14. At the core this
component only shows a network of classmates. Once reduced to k-core
10, shown in figure (b) the component shows other associates of the drive
owner. The modularities we calculated for this graph at the core, at k-core
10, and unfiltered were .247, .641, and .771 respectively, suggesting that
this component could be partitioned into communities. Further statistics for
this graph are given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
the graphs show multiple nodes for the drive owner. There are many nodes labeled
as the drive owner’s, each one represented a different email addresses that the drive
owner had. Notably, in this case the different email aliases are situated in different
communities, suggesting that the owner used different addresses to communicate with
different groups.
In component d1c2, we again see distinct communities emerge outside the graph’s
core. The core at k = 19 and the 10-core are displayed in Figure 5.8. This compo-
nent was extracted from the drive of a university student who was a part of many
organizations. The student used Outlook to send and receive mail. The student con-
firmed that all the graph nodes were members of the various university organizations.
However, these members were associated with the student via group emails and never
personally introduced. In Figure 5.8, we show component d1c2 with k-core reduced
to 10 because this graph also demonstrates a potential for community detection.
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(a) The network at the core (b) The network with k = 10
Figure 5.8: Component d1c2: Displays a loose network of students who
were members of various University clubs that fell under the same higher
organization. The component displayed is filtered to the core, which is 19.
It had nodes, edges, and a modularity of 50, 650, .496 respectively. The
nodes are colored by degree. The nodes that are not colored in red all
belong to the drive owner. Further statistics for this graph is given in tables
5.4 and 5.3
The next series of graphs comes from d9 and we will talk about Components d9c1,
d9c4, and d9c11 from this drive. This storage device belonged to a user who was also
the administrator for a web-server running on the device. Therefore, the owner had
email addresses and connections that belonged to personnel who did not access his
machine directly. The server was set up to send copies of emails to the administrator’s
in-box, when that specific email account had turned on its “away messages.” The
business was using Dovecot to run their email server and SquirrelMail to access their
in-boxes. Dovecot is an open source POP3 email server for Linux systems. The
business also conducted web-hosting services for one of their clients. Component
d9c1 shown in Figure 5.9 is a graph from a business owner’s drive; it shows employees
and clients.
Component d9c1 had too many nodes to be visually useful without further filtering,
but still displayed a number of striking characteristics. The drive owner confirmed
that this graph had email addresses from different clients and employees of the orga-
nization. This graph would be a good candidate to break up into clusters of smaller
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Figure 5.9: Component d9c1: Displays a network of employees and clients.
This figure shows the component filtered to its core of 14. Notably, it’s
core has a far more complex structure than the cores of most other graphs
we analyzed. This component is a good candidate for future research in
community detection. The graph had a modularity of .87 with no filter and
a modularity of .821 at the core, both of which scores are unusually high
and indicate that the communities are very distinct. The nodes in this figure
are colored by modularity class to show this strong partitioning. Further
statistics for this component are given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
.
communities, as discussed in Future Work (Section 6.2). The drive owner stated
there were 20 clients, which matches closely to the 19 modularity classes identified.
In addition, this graph had a modularity of .821 at the core suggesting that groups
did not cross communicate. As a result of conducting web-hosting services, compo-
nents d9c11 and d9c4 contain information about the social network of the web-hosting
client. Two graphs belonging exclusively to the client’s organization are demonstrated
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in Figure 5.10. These graphs were included because it was interesting to find social
networks that belonged to groups that did not include the drive owner. However,
because these email addresses did not belong to anyone in the drive owner’s personal
social network there was not a lot of additional information we could obtain about
these components. The drive owner was only able to offer that these were employees
of a particular company.
We note, however, that these two graphs show a visually distinct structure that differs
from that of the social networks shown in previous figures. Although there are many
edges, few nodes have very high degree—most are connected to only a few neighbors
in a long chain of cliques. For example, in d9c4 the highest degree node is 8, and
the vast majority have a degree of 5, indicating that they communicate only with a
few neighbors. In some cases, these connections are repeated many times, which is
what produces the heavy-weighted paths running across the graph. In most other
cases, the edge weights are uniform. We inspected the underlying disk images and
found that these graphs were both produced from zipped files that Bulk Extractor
had unzipped. Component d9c4 was found in unallocated space, but Component
d9c11 was associated with a path that suggested it was a database (the letters “db”
were included in the file name). We suspect these graphs may come from files that
store electronic address books.
The last graph of interest is Component d4c4, which is displayed in figure 5.11, was
a graph of Facebook user-ID’s. Superficially, this component seems to share some
of the visual markers of components d9c11 and d9c4; however, the further analysis
reveals that the structure is more complicated—we see a larger range of degrees and
connections across different IDs, which suggest repetition of IDs in different contexts
on the underlying storage media. Although the user-IDs were all of “friends” on
Facebook of the actual owner of the laptop, none of our centrality metrics gave an
accurate picture of the friends that the owner communicated with most frequently.
The drive owner stated that while they knew all the users in this graph, they rarely
if ever communicated with those who had the heaviest edge weight. The addresses
were extracted from unallocated space, but it is possible that they are the result of a
local cache for the Facebook web application.
59
(a) Social Network of Client 1
(component d9c11)
(b) Social Network of Client 2
(component d9c4)
Figure 5.10: Components d9c11 & d9c4: Displays two components from
d9, unfiltered. These contained 30 and 233 nodes respectively of email ad-
dresses belonging exclusively to client organizations. The nodes are colored
by degree. Further statistics for these graphs are given in Tables 5.4 and 5.3
Figure 5.11: Component d4c4: Displays the drive owners Facebook “friends”.
This is a component from drive 4. While the modularity was .643, the drive
owner could not explain why any set of people would be grouped together.
The entire component as a whole made a sensible set. The entire component
was comprised of nodes that held the user-IDs of the drive owners Facebook
“friends”. The nodes are colored by degree. Further statistics for this graph
is given in tables 5.4 and 5.3
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5.5 Discussion of Centrality Measures and Their Ef-
fectiveness
In addition to identifying and examining social networks, we also wanted to determine
whether we could automatically discover people who were leaders of these extracted
groups. Upon completion of our exit interviews with the drive owners we determined
that Eigenvector centrality best reflected the most important personnel in the group.
Those that the drive owner communicated with most frequently had an Eigenvector
score of close to one. In cases where the components contained more than 200 nodes,
we calculated the Eigenvector and Betweenness centralities for each node after filtering
graphs to their cores. For graphs which contained less than 200 nodes we did not
filter to the core since 200 is an acceptable number of associates to have. Though
Eigenvector centrality was more accurate per exit interviews with the drive owners,
these scores were very similar, often with the same top twenty associates, although the
order was slightly different. As Betweenness centrality is more expensive to compute,
we conclude that the Eigenvector centrality is indeed the best measure for these
networks. Closeness centrality was also calculated on every node and included in
our data tables, but this metric was not reviewed in detail with drive owners. Since
centrality is calculated on every node we do not include these have statistics in our
previous tables. A sample of the centrality calculations is given in Table 5.7 for the
top 20 nodes with the highest centrality scores in drive d4c2. Our preliminary results
demonstrate this to be a promising area for future work, in order to determine if
Eigenvector centrality can indicate close associates and if the convergence of scores
between Eigenvector and Betweenness indicate valid social networks.
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Ranked by Eigenvector Ranked by Betweenness Ranked by Closeness
Drive Owner(1) Drive Owner(2257.290) Drive Owner(.547)
Father(.684) Father(1527.947) Father(.537)
Classmate A(.654) Drive Owner Alt Email 2(863.901) Drive Owner Alt Email 2(.515)
Classmate B(.623) Unknown Email Address 1(581.414) Drive Owner Alt Email 3(.476)
Drive Owner Alt Email 1(.603) Classmate Q(467.205) Coworker different depts(.468)
Classmate C(.603) Classmate K(378.889) Classmate A(.465)
Classmate D(.599) Department Store(332.431) Drive Owner Alt Email 1(.456)
Classmate E(.599) Classmate A(310.950) Unknown Email Address 2(.453)
Classmate F(.595) Unknown Email Address 2(277.630) Schoolmate not in same class(.450)
Classmate G(.593) Classmate D(272.832) Classmate J(.450)
Classmate H(.573) Aunt(272.697). Classmate Q(.447)
Classmate I(.572) Drive Owner Alt Email 3(248.521) Classmate B(.444)
Classmate J(.553) Classmate L(229.499) Classmate P(.441)
Classmate K(.546) Cousin(228.484) Classmate D(.438)
Classmate L(.536) Classmate P(223.538) Unknown Email Address 1(.437)
Drive Owner Alt Email 2(.532) Coworker same dept 1(220.764) Department Store(.434)
Classmate M(.530) Classmate B(215.833) Spouse(.432)
Classmate N(.525) Classmate M(210.764) Classmate E(.430)
Classmate O(.522) Classmate E(195.212) Coworker same dept(.430)
Classmate P(.521) Unknown Email Address 3(190.734) Unknown Email Address 3(.430)
Table 5.7: This table shows the variations between most important node
ranking by centrality metrics.
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CHAPTER 6:
Conclusions and Future Work
In this final chapter we present an overview of the goals, results, and contributions
of our research. We also answer the questions asked in chapter 1. In addition, we
present some suggestions for continued research in this area.
6.1 Conclusions
We wanted to assist analysts who depend on the ability to understand the relation-
ships between people of interest to their investigations. The goal of our research
was to present a new method of analyzing correlations between email addresses, in
order to make analysts more efficient during investigations and decrease their work-
load. We accomplished this goal by automatically extracting email addresses and
creating graphs depicting the relationships between them, then showing that these
relationships correspond to real-life social network information.
Our work extended beyond simply discovering social networks. In addition to the
social networks of many drive owners, we also observed installed OS files and applica-
tions, and usernames used to log onto specific web applications. In components where
social networks were confirmed, we saw evidence of specific communities within social
networks that could be detected and isolated. We identified four interesting types of
graphs:
1. Components that displayed classic properties of social networks, such as high
centrality scores at the core and high edge weights and degree for email addresses
belonging to drive owners.
2. Components that could be partitioned into different communities: these graphs
demonstrated high modularity.
3. Graphs consisting of usernames (logon IDs) for web applications; these graphs
had high edge weights, low modularity, and a small number of nodes.
4. Graphs that were interesting but require additional study, such as component
d4c4. While Type four graphs did display social networks, the clustering of
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components, modularity, and edge weights did not mirror the communication
patterns between email addresses.
Contributions of our research include a new method of analyzing relationship between
email addresses, creation of a new dataset, and testing measures of centrality scores
to automatically classify email addresses. We showed that our method for detecting
social networks can be used to group email addresses that indicate real communica-
tion between users and those that do not. We created a new dataset by collecting
images from volunteers. In addition, we extracted graphs from each drive, broke the
graphs into components and recorded statistics for all graphs that demonstrated valid
social networks. These datasets can be used to conduct further testing with ground
truth. We also tested measures of centrality on email addresses that came from social
networks and validated our results with drive owners. Our findings demonstrated
that this technique can potentially be used to automatically classify email addresses.
Finally, we answer the research questions asked in Chapter 1:
Can the proximity and quantity of co-located email address pairs on sec-
ondary storage media be used to discover information about social net-
works?
Yes. For nine out of ten drives we were able to discover at least one social network.
There were no social networks discovered on d6 but as previously mentioned that drive
was co-located in the same laptop as. Drive d5 had eight social networks. The av-
erage number of social networks discovered across drives were 2.2 and the mode was
1. We discovered networks that included soccer teams, classmates, extracurricular
clubs, co-workers, friends, family, and clients.
Can these properties be used to distinguish between true positives (email
addresses used for communication between human users) and false posi-
tives such as text that happens to have the “@” symbol.
The proximity and the quantity of co-located email addresses did little to establish
the difference between true positives and false positives. However, the components
we extracted were composed of email addresses that tended to be in one category or
the other. For example, all drive owners that were running Microsoft Windows had
within the top four components a graph with the same Microsoft email addresses and
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user-names, and for the majority of the drives the best components containing social
networking data were within the top three largest components.
6.2 Future Work
While our research produced a new tool and provided another method for discovering
social networks, there is room for improvement. Areas of potential improvement in-
clude reverse engineering ID strings for applications other than email, speed optimiza-
tions, community-detection, fingerprinting, resolving email address aliases, reducing
noise, and social network structure hierarchy-detection. Developments in these areas
would multiply the benefits for analysts conducting research or investigations.
The ability to reverse engineer ID strings would be useful in the cases where we
discovered clusters of addresses with identical domain names that were written in
plain-text but contained user names that were encoded with an alias such as a hash
code or numbered user-ID. For Facebook user-ID’s there are already Internet tools
that can take a Facebook ID and provide the user-name equivalent when an ID is
entered manually. This process could be automated in cases where access to online
lookup tools is a feasible solution. In other cases, a deeper investigation of the ID
scheme may be warranted.
Community Detection is another area that can be further studied in relation to our
methods. In our research, we were able to extract on average of one to two social
networks per drive. This was done by analyzing components of the drive and filtering
the components by their core. However, even with our filtering techniques components
representing social networks could still be very large, such as Component d9c1. It
would be beneficial if social networks found in graphs like Component d9c1 could be
further dissected in community structures and discoveries made about those specific
communities. For example, which person is the gateway to the different community
sub-sets.
In our research, some of the false positives included code that was unique to certain
software libraries, email clusters that represented a network of programmers that
developed a particular application, domains that were specific to certain Operating
Systems including those typically installed as Virtual Machines, and clusters that
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represented a network of email addresses from online subscriptions that user sub-
scribed to. These subscriptions included online magazines and newspapers. While
these graphs do not depict the type of networks we are interested in, they could be
used to discover what software the user is running, whether or not they have multiple
Virtual Machines, and what on-line subscriptions they are receiving.
Email address alias resolution is another area for future work. Drive owners and
their associates had many different email addresses, each represented as a different
node in the graph. In some studies researchers may want to combine email addresses
that belong to the same person. Developing a method to detect email address aliases
would be helpful to clearly recognize connections between specific users instead of
between specific email addresses.
In addition, it would be beneficial for researchers to develop automated methods to
eliminate graphs that are not useful. Reducing noise can be accomplished by the
systematic analysis of metrics related to "Useful" and "Not Useful" components.
Metrics such as those given in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 can be calculated on a large
sample of "Useful" and "Not Useful" components to identify features that correlate
to graphs that depict social structures. The goal is to reduce the number of graphs
returned from Betographer by eliminating graphs that are not useful. As previously
stated, while many of the graphs are useful for fingerprinting purposes they did not
show true social networks. When searching for social networks these graphs should
be ignored or eliminated.
The last suggestion is to conduct further work in centrality measurements of individ-
ual nodes to discover hierarchies in their social structure. Our results suggest that
Eigenvector and Betweenness calculations can be used to give each node a score and
that nodes with the highest scores tend to represent the most important people and
their closest associates within the component. It would be interesting to determine
whether these scores can be used to determine the hierarchical structure of the social
networks and whether the convergence of centrality scores (Eigenvector, Betweenness,






Below is the source code for the betographer program.
#!/usr/bin/env python3






from concurrent.futures import ProcessPoolExecutor, as_completed




email_file = join(be_dir, "email.txt")
with open(email_file, "rb") as f:




print("Line contains invalid utf-8; skipping")
if line[0] == "#":
continue
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if root not in list_dict:
list_dict[root] = [(offset, alias)]
else:
list_dict[root].append((offset,alias))











for l in feature_data.values():
node_q.clear()
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for offset, alias in l:
while (node_q and (node_q[0][0] < offset - win_size)):
node_q.popleft()
for n in node_q:
pair = tuple(sorted([alias, n[1]]))












for pair, weight in edge_weights.items():















index = 0 if n == 0 else len(self.lines) - n
for l in self.lines[index:]: print(l)
def write(self):
with open(self.path, "w") as f:





with open(dir_list, "r") as d:
for line in d:
dirs.append(line.strip().rstrip(os.sep))
return dirs
def process_many(in_dirs, num_jobs, outdir, args):
out_dirs = [join(outdir, basename(subdir)) for subdir in in_dirs]
arguments = zip(in_dirs, out_dirs, [args]*num_jobs, [True]*num_jobs)
with ProcessPoolExecutor() as executor:
executor.map(process_one, arguments)
def process_one(arguments):







gname = basename(normpath(be_dir)) + "_" + str(win_size) + ".gexf"
sumfile = basename(normpath(be_dir)) + "_" + str(win_size) + "_summary.txt"
if not os.path.exists(out_dir):
os.makedirs(out_dir)
sumpath = join(out_dir, sumfile)
gpath = join(out_dir, gname)
summary = Summary(sumpath)
summary.add("BEtographer summary for command line invocation:")
summary.add(" ".join(sys.argv))
summary.add(bar)
summary.add("Using Window Size: {}".format(win_size))
summary.add("Writing graphs to: {}".format(gpath))
summary.add(bar)
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n()
start = timeit.default_timer()
nodes, email_data = ingest_email(be_dir)
ingest_time = timeit.default_timer()
summary.add("Ingested in {} seconds".format(ingest_time - start))
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n(1)
edges, weighted_edges = find_edges(email_data, win_size)
edge_time = timeit.default_timer()
summary.add("All neighbors linked in {} seconds".format(edge_time - ingest_time))
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n(1)
if no_loner:
friends = set()








summary.add("Finished in {} seconds".format(end - start))
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n(1)
summary.add(bar)






summary.add("Looking for the top {} subgraphs".format(big_subs))
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n(1)
major_subs = find_big_connected_components(G, big_subs)
subgraph_end = timeit.default_timer()
subgraph_time = subgraph_end - subgraph_start
summary.add("Found {} big subgraphs in {} seconds.".format(len(major_subs),
subgraph_time))
if not multi_mode: summary.print_last_n(1)
for g in major_subs:
summary.add(bar)
summary.add("Summary Statistics for subgraph {}:".format(i))
summary.add(bar)
summary.add(nx.info(g))
gname = basename(normpath(be_dir)) + "_" + str(win_size) + "sub" + str(i) + ".gexf"
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print("Check {} for a summary of the results.".format(sumpath))
if __name__=="__main__":
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=’Discover networks in bulk’
’ extractor email.txt output.’)
group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
group.add_argument(’be_results_path’, nargs=’?’,
help="Path to bulk_extractor output files. Required unless"
" running with the -p option.")
parser.add_argument(’-o’, ’--output-path’, required=True,
help="Sets the directory where betographer should store its"
" output (required).")
parser.add_argument(’-w’, ’--win-size’, type=int, default=256,
help=’Optionally sets the window size in bytes. Default is 256.’)
parser.add_argument(’-d’, ’--drop-loners’, action=’store_true’,
help=’Drop all nodes with no edges to other nodes.’)
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parser.add_argument(’-m’, ’--big-subgraphs’, metavar=’N’, type=int,
help=’Save a separate gexf file for the top N largest’
’ connected components of the graph.’)
group.add_argument(’-p’, ’--parallel’, dest="dir_list",
help=’Specify name of a file containing a list of bulk’
’ extractor output directories and process these’
’ in parallel. An output directory will be created’






process_many(in_dirs, num_jobs, args.output_path, args)
very_end = timeit.default_timer()
print()
print("Completed {} jobs in {} seconds.".format(num_jobs, very_end - multi_start))
else:
process_one((args.be_results_path, args.output_path, args, False))
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APPENDIX B:
Node and Edge Counts
B.1 Node and Edge Counts
Table B.1: A Count of the Nodes and Edges in Each Graph.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sub-graphs Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges Nodes Edges
Graph 1 9324 24751 9035 23617 24075 64624 16214 31634 10 24 28658 365054 7655 33789 12283 33968 534 819 19953 62610
Graph 2 6087 26847 867 1769 2469 6577 10192 39406 8 7 599 598 4640 11672 1630 2287 9 21 282 1266
Graph 3 270 295 277 363 260 667 692 821 6 5 297 312 277 363 495 835 8 7 277 363
Graph 4 104 138 188 670 249 259 328 1263 6 5 277 363 233 657 91 105 8 14 129 146
Graph 5 73 72 188 191 168 546 148 202 6 5 187 186 118 290 79 97 5 10 94 161
Graph 6 69 80 75 131 100 286 141 261 5 4 132 131 63 181 70 205 5 5 93 115
Graph 7 61 78 41 51 100 192 123 167 4 3 62 81 59 153 65 115 5 4 80 168
Graph 8 58 74 35 99 75 157 110 267 4 4 51 90 41 69 56 97 5 8 78 95
Graph 9 55 81 31 35 57 73 107 136 3 2 38 80 37 135 54 105 4 4 70 93
Graph 10 55 76 30 83 51 99 61 116 3 2 36 148 36 90 39 73 4 3 70 170
Graph 11 52 53 30 31 48 87 58 84 3 3 32 37 30 36 36 56 4 4 67 67
Graph 12 51 50 28 66 46 89 57 57 3 3 26 25 26 42 35 107 4 3 54 63
Graph 13 47 77 28 74 45 149 54 58 3 3 23 82 25 25 35 99 3 3 49 137
Graph 14 46 56 25 31 45 95 53 53 3 3 23 61 24 70 34 37 3 2 48 106
Graph 15 43 70 24 48 44 85 51 90 2 1 23 88 23 41 33 55 3 3 48 89
Graph 16 42 43 23 56 42 74 44 60 2 1 23 52 23 37 31 76 3 2 46 145
Graph 17 41 122 22 25 39 61 43 42 2 1 20 25 22 26 30 34 3 2 44 119
Graph 18 36 38 21 22 39 75 40 50 2 1 20 42 21 50 28 66 3 2 44 72
Graph 19 35 99 21 34 38 69 38 40 2 1 18 39 19 39 27 37 3 3 36 68
Graph 20 35 66 20 25 38 37 36 47 2 1 18 62 19 58 25 26 3 3 36 87
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APPENDIX C:
Exit-Interview Questions for Drive Owners
C.1 Exit-Interview Questions for Drive Owners
The following are questions which were asked during exit-interviews with those who
volunteered their storage media:
1. You will be presented with a list of email addresses. For each email address,
indicate whether you recognize the email address.
2. If you recognize an email address, please provide the following additional informa-
tion:
• Is this an address of a person who has (to your knowledge) used your computer?
• Is this an address of a person with whom you communicate by email?
3. In general, does the graph accurately describe the relationship between the corre-
spondents listed?
4. If the graph is clustered into different groups, are you able to discern a reason for
the clustering (for example, different groups may represent coworkers, family, friends,
etc.)?
5. What operating system do you use (e.g. Windows 7, Windows 8, OSX 10.7, etc.)?
6. What email client do you use (Outlook, Outlook Express, Apple Mail, Web-based
email, other (please describe))? If you use multiple clients (for example if you use
Outlook for official email and Gmail for personal email), please list all of them and
approximate the percent of time used on each.
7. How long have you used this computer?
8. Have there been any prior users / owners of this computer?
9. Do you share the computer with anyone else?
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10. How often do you communicate by email (daily / weekly / monthly)?
11. Why do you believe that these email addresses were collected as pairs? Are these
emails frequently on the same address lines for emails or some other situation such
as used for log on purposes or all located within the same webpage? If so how often
are they used or accessed for this purpose?
12. The clusters shown on the graph are assumed to be related. To your knowledge is
that true? Do the clusters represent a group such as a group of co-workers or family
members?
13. Are you the only user of this hard drive? If not how many people and how often
do they use it? Did this hard drive have a prior owner? How long have you been
using the hard drive?
14. Is there anything else you would like to add? For example, if the analysis you were
presented with is incorrect, do you have an explanation about what went wrong?
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